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ABSTRACT 
Unemployment is one of the biggest challenges facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
especially among youth. The Saudi government embarked on a national plan to increase 
employment among nationals and decrease the number of foreign labor force. The 
Saudization program did not yield the expected results, and efforts were made to reform 
the program in 2011 under the “Nitaqat Program”. Despite enhancements to the 
Saudization program, the analysis reveals that unemployment levels remained almost 
stagnant throughout the past decade. The Saudi labor force is increasing by a rate equal to 
the rate of employment among nationals, thus keeping unemployment rates stagnant. The 
Saudi labor market suffers from number of distortions; chiefly; the wage differential 
between nationals and non-nationals in the private sector, the wage differential between 
nationals in both private and public sectors, and decreased labor productivity in the private 
sector. Also, the reservation wage among Saudi-nationals is high due to dependency ratio 
and the introduction of an unemployment benefit that is two-thirds the amount of the 
national minimum wage. On the other side the cost of foreign labor in the market remains 
low despite the introduction of measures to increase this cost on private sector employers. 
In addition, the education system has not catered to the needs of the labor market, which 
suffers a skill gap in demand and supply. The lack of vocational and technical skills is 
visible in the market, while a mismatch exists between higher education and labor market 
needs. The dependence of the Saudization program on quota-based, legal-interventionist 
methods is proving to be a challenge, further attesting to the need to rely more on a market 
driven system. Unless the distortions in the labor market are addressed, the Saudization 
efforts will remain stagnant, since these distortions are creating an imperative for youth 
unemployment. 
 
Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Unemployment, Saudization, Nitaqat Program, Labor Market, 
Youth, Wage Deferential, Reservation Wage, Labor Productivity, Labor Market 
Segmentation, Education and Labor Market, Vocational and Technical Education. 
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I. Introduction 
Youth unemployment is one of the predicaments the Arab World is suffering from; 
it is a main challenge that governments in the region need to face in a time when youth 
represent more than half the population of Arab societies. The Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) regions registered the highest youth unemployment rate among the 
developing regions at 28.3 percent and 23.7 percent respectively (ILO, 2013). In addition, 
the MENA region registered the highest labor force growth rate in the world (Figure 1), 
surpassing even sub-Saharan Africa (Saif & Abdul Khalek, 2011). The failure to meet such 
unemployment challenge will have many implications; not least on the political stability of 
the countries as has been exposed by the Arab Spring wave in 2011, especially since two-
thirds of MENA population is under 30 years, which is twice the number of the same age 
group in the United States. In general, the Arab World’s performance in the area of human-
capital development has been weak, and while high-income Arab states registered lower 
rates of unemployment in comparison to lower-income Arab states; Saudi Arabia, 
specifically; noted as the only exception of a high-income Arab state with a high 
unemployment rate (UNDP, 2009).  
In this respect, the Saudi government introduced a national job-localization 
program, Saudization, with an aim to curb unemployment among Saudi nationals, by 
imposing a quota-based system that enforces the hiring of nationals in the private sector 
and reducing the number of non-national workers in the labor force. The Saudi economy is 
bloated with foreign expatriates, especially in the private sector where they represent a 
rough 3:1 ratio against nationals. The ‘Saudization’ program sought to decrease the 
number of non-national labor by means of enforceability through a quota-system regime, 
limiting work-permits for expatriates, and providing training programs for Saudi youth. 
However, this program became a source of scrutiny in KSA as the number of foreign-
workers kept on increasing, while job-localization efforts remained stagnant, further 
attesting the challenge to attain the program’s declared goals and objectives. 
Both of Saudi Arabia’s five-year development plans; the Seventh (2000–2004) and 
Eighth (2005-2009), targeted reducing the foreign labor-force in the country while 
 decreasing unemployment among Saudi nationals. Yet, throughout this period, the number 
of expatriates increased while unemployment rates among nationals remained stagnant. On 
the other hand, KSA economy registered high
government spending. In fact, the Saudi economy was creating jobs; however, these jobs 
went to non-nationals despite the stringent implementation of the Saudization program. 
This in turn raises questions over the feasibility of this program and t
lead to the continuous unemployment predicament especially among youth; while taking 
into account that the Saudi economy is not in recession and is actually creating jobs.
Figure 1: Labor Force Growth Rate in Wo
Source: World Bank 
Saudi intellectuals paid great attention to two issues, arguing that they are the main 
reasons behind the current predicament of unemployment. First, number of scholars argued 
that the poor quality of the educational system 
the needed talents to compete in an evolving global market economy. Second, criticism 
was paid to the culture of lavishness in which Saudi youth dwells, reflecting on the lack of 
work ethics among Saudi youth and 
from the state. 
However, this has not been always the case. For example, 
presents facts that during the pre
late 1950s, two-thirds of Saudi employees in 
(ARAMCO) were skilled or semi
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represented 80 percent of ARAMCO’s employees. Further, attesting that the current 
attitude among Saudi youth in which they look downward at menial labor work is actually 
a new phenomenon that started after the prosperity of the oil-boom era in the mid-1970s, 
and the creation of a rentier economic structure that helped solidifying the sense of 
receiving easy income rather than working hard to earn it.  
Nevertheless, the issue of unemployment in Saudi Arabia could be related to 
number of different factors such as; the segmentation of the labor market as witnessed in 
the wage-deferential between nationals and non-nationals, lack of proper labor-laws 
reform, lack of a market driven education system, delayed efforts to diversify the economy, 
and the structure of the economy itself. This research aims at discussing the nature of the 
current unemployment challenge that Saudi Arabia faces, discussing the shortfalls of the 
‘Saudization’ program, and hence arguing in favor of policies that could enhance the 
government’s efforts to meet the stated unemployment challenge. 
  
4 
 
II. Statement of the Problem 
The Saudization program, which aimed throughout the previous decade to provide 
a solution to the unemployment problem in Saudi Arabia, became a controversial issue. 
The debate over the program’s successes and failures to attain its own declared goals and 
objectives raises many questions over whether the need arises for devising new set of 
policies to remedy the continuing unemployment predicament. 
 
Research Objectives: 
1. Analyze the ‘Saudization’ program and the reasons behind its current success and 
failure. 
 
2. Explore alternative policies and remedies to achieve the program stated goals. 
 
Research Question: 
To what extent the Saudization program throughout the previous decade does 
provide a solution to unemployment in Saudi Arabia? Have the program attained its own 
declared goals and objectives? What are the alternative policies and programs to achieve 
the goals? 
 
Investigative Questions: 
- What are the evidences of success or failure regarding Saudization program? 
- What factors affect Saudization in private sector? Does salary, size of company or 
educational level make a difference? 
- How did Saudization perform across sectors of the economy?  
- How the economy is transforming with Saudization? 
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III. Background 
Unemployment in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia faces a high rate of unemployment, put at 37 percent among Saudi 
youth population in 2002 (Kabbani & Kothari, 2005), which was an alarming figure, 
although KSA government insisted on putting unemployment rate at around 10 percent. 
There are number of factors, which make up the composition of drivers that affect Saudi 
Arabia and determine the nature of its current unemployment challenge. First, similar to 
the rest of its Gulf States neighbors, Saudi Arabia is a “Rentier State”; a country which 
relies on external rents of its natural resources to generate state revenue (Beblawi & 
Luciani, 1987)and (Ali & Abdelatif, 2013)with oil accounting for 90 percent of exports 
and 45.8 percent of the GDP (World Bank, 2014). Second, unlike the rest of its Gulf States 
neighbors, Saudi Arabia is a large country (one-fourth the size of continental USA) with a 
population larger than the population of the rest of Gulf States combined. The Saudi 
population witnessed 333 percent population growth over the past three decades. 
The 1974 census puts the total population in Saudi Arabia at 7 million with 6.2 
million Saudi-nationals, while the 2010 census shows that the total population reached 27 
million with around 18.5 million Saudi-nationals (CDSI, 2012). While almost 70 percent 
of the Saudi population is under 30 years old, the country is further challenged with a high 
population growth rate estimated at around 3.3 percent/year throughout the past decades 
and only faltering to 2.15 percent/year recently. This means that many Saudis are still 
bound to enter the labor market as job seekers in the near future as 37 percent of the Saudi 
population is under 14 years of age as of 2012 (UNDESA, 2012). Moreover, some 
forecasts state that while 70 percent of the Saudi population is under 30 years; with current 
influx of males and females to the labor market; Saudi unemployment could reach the level 
of 50 percent within ten years (Ramady M. A., 2010). 
The ‘rentier’ economy’ creates a vicious cycle where citizens are no longer the 
efficient factor of production and wealth creation in the economy, but rather the recipients 
of wealth generated by the state/government through external rent, in this case oil 
exportation. The rent from natural resources encourages unemployment, number of 
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scholarly works explored the concept of ‘Rentier States’ (Mahdavy, 1970), (Delacroix, 
1980), (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987),(Luciani, 1990)and (Ali & Abdelatif, 2013)tackling 
among many points how such a system tends to put the society into a fixation of 
unproductiveness and dependency on ‘external rents’ received rather than ‘income’ 
generated by productivity contributing to the economy, which results in many negative 
consequences; a phenomenon came to be known as the “oil curse”. 
Other studies show that dependence on oil endowment results in curbing growth in 
the non-oil sector and hinders diversification of the economy; thus, leading the private 
sector to become reliant on government stimulus expenditure (Elbadawi & Gelb, 2010). In 
addition, one of the negative consequences of this ‘oil curse’ is the culture of rent seeking 
and political largesse, which results in the inefficient use of the natural resources in 
absence of strong state institutions (Elbadawi & Soto, 2012). The experience of almost all 
rentier states argues Karl (2004) illustrates that oil-led development results in number of 
negative consequences including among many; barriers to economic diversification, high 
unemployment rates and higher defense spending (Ali & Abdelatif, 2013). As pointed out 
by Al-Sheikh and Erbas(2012); KSA is an example of how the ‘oil curse’ affects the labor 
market. 
While employment rate among Saudi nationals increased by 4.6 percent in the 
period of 2010-2012, unemployment rate increased by 8.5 percent to reach a current rate of 
12 percent among Saudi nationals with youth and females mostly affected, as 
unemployment rates among them stands at 30 percent and 35 percent respectively (IMF, 
2013a). However, a statistical review by Flynn(2011) based on the official Saudi dataset of 
2008 concludes that out of a working-age Saudi population of 11.4 million (15+ years) 
only 4.08 million are in the labor force (3.4 million males and 657,000 females) and some 
of 400,000 unemployed, which puts unemployment rate in KSA at 9.8 percent, precisely 
24.9 percent among females and 6.9 percent among males. Yet, in 2011, the Saudi 
government introduced a new measure; unemployment benefit that provides young job 
seekers with a monthly allowance for a maximum period of one year. When that measure 
was launched Saudi officials expected 500,000 to sign, but instead 7 times as many did, 
almost 3.5 million (Knickmeyer, 2011). The introduction of this jobless benefit (named: 
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Hafiz Program) revealed that unemployment rate was more than 20 percent of the labor 
force; and that the Saudi economy must absorb around 400,000 new entrants to the job 
market each year (Devaux, 2013). 
In September 2002, the Saudi government announced that within 6 months Saudi-
nationals would replace foreign taxi drivers, representing 90 percent of total taxi drivers in 
KSA. However, that deadline was not met, and later the government announced that the 
process will be extended for another 3 years, yet, that deadline was not met as 
well(Janardhan, 2011). This along many other examples reveals the limitations of the 
current Saudi job-localization model to ignite the needed exponential employment of 
nationals. The current quota-based system reflects the limited capacity of the private sector 
to absorb job seekers. This happens against a backdrop of high public sector employment 
where 80 percent of all working Saudis have a government job, and 9 out of 10 jobs among 
Saudis are in the public sector. The Saudi government is a big employer, hence, the policy 
of pushing private sector to share in carrying the burden of employing nationals through 
imposing quotas for hiring them. Nevertheless, the problem of competition between both 
sectors arise with public sector being more attractive to young Saudis due to better wages, 
fringe benefits, job security, favorable working conditions and less working hours. 
With a population increasing by around 500,000 a year, the Saudi government 
needs higher job creation rates to absorb new entrants to the job market. The participation 
of Saudis in the labor force rose from 36 percent to 40 percent in the period of 2009-2013, 
while a normal participation rate for an economy with the size of Saudi Arabia is 65 
percent (Sfakianakis, 2014a). Some estimates suggest that the Saudi economy is losing 
around SAR 60 billion in GDP output yearly due to unemployment, based on conservative 
estimates of a male-only 15 percent unemployment (Ramady M. A., 2010). 
Economic Growth 
Escaping the ‘rentier state’ syndrome is quite a challenge; since the rentier model 
by default continuous to feed the economy with benefits, making it impossible to break the 
chain and create an atmosphere of economic incentives triggering income growth 
modalities rather than just receiving rent. The unemployment predicament that KSA faces 
8 
 
cannot be attributed to slower economic activity, rather the nature of the problem created 
by this ‘rentier state syndrome’ is more structural and goes far beyond the mere point of 
economic growth. As a matter of fact, KSA witnessed an economic growth in the past 
decade due to rising oil prices, which makes the region an exception from world trend in a 
time when world economies suffered from an international economic crisis (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: GDP Growth Rate, KSA and World, 2004 – 2013 
 
Source: World Bank 
KSA economic indicators for the period of 2007-2013 were showing positive signs 
(Table 1), in trade balance, current account balance, net foreign assets, capital formation 
and real GDP growth, especially growth in private sector as percentage of GDP, which 
surpassed the growth of oil-sector as percentage of real GDP growth on average (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Growth in Saudi GDP Real 2007-2013 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning 
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Table 1: KSA Economic Indicators 2007 – 2013. (USD 1 = SAR 3.75) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012r 2013p 
Gross Domestic Product-Nominal (SR billion) 1,558.8 1,949.2 1,609.1 1,975.5 2,510.7 2,752.3 2,806.7 
Growth in GDP-Nominal (%) 10.4 25.0 -17.4 22.8 27.1 9.6 2.0 
GDP  Real (1999 prices - SR billion) 899.6 975.4 993.3 1,067.1 1,158.5 1,225.9 1,274.3 
Non-Oil Private Sector * 541.2 603.1 633.5 696.2 749.7 794.0 839.6 
Non-Oil Government Sector * 141.8 145.2 152.5 162.9 175.9 185.3 190.6 
Oil Sector * 207.3 216.1 197.1 197.4 221.9 234.9 232.6 
Growth in GDP Real (%)   6.0 8.4 1.8 7.4 8.6 5.8 4.0 
Growth in Private Sector (%)   11.7 11.4 5.0 9.9 7.7 5.9 5.8 
Growth in Government Sector (%)   1.9 2.4 5.0 6.8 7.9 5.3 2.9 
Growth in Oil Sector (%) -4.1 4.3 -8.8 0.2 12.4 5.8 -1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation  
(1999 prices - SR billion) 314.3 361.9 339.6 389.1 438.3 446.3 465.7 
Growth in Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) 19.4 15.1 -6.2 14.6 12.6 1.8 4.3 
GDP/Capita Total Population (SR Thousand) 62.5 75.6 60.4 71.7 88.5 94.3 93.6 
Total Population-mid-year (Million persons) 24.94 25.79 26.66 27.56 28.38 29.20 29.99 
Saudis  17.69 18.12 18.54 18.97 19.41 19.84 20.27 
Non-Saudis  7.25 7.67 8.12 8.59 8.97 9.36 9.72 
Total Employment (Thousand persons) 7,766.4 7,956.8 8,148.0 8,834.9 9,935.5 10,136.4 10,634.7 
Saudis 3,584.7 3,678.6 3,837.9 3,955.2 4,143.1 4,251.7 4,631.2 
Non-Saudis 4,181.7 4,278.2 4,310.1 4,879.7 5,792.4 5,884.7 6,003.5 
Government Budget Balance (SR billion) 176.6 580.9 -86.6 87.7 291.1 374.1 180.3 
Revenues  642.8 1,101.0 509.8 741.6 1,117.8 1,247.4 1,156.4 
Expenditures  466.3 520.1 596.4 653.9 826.7 873.3 976.0 
Balance as % Share of GDP-Nominal 11.3 29.8 -5.4 4.4 11.6 13.6 6.4 
Merchandise Exports (fob - SR billion) 874.4 1,175.5 721.1 941.8 1,367.6 1,456.5 1,409.7 
Oil (Crude & refined products) 769.9 1,053.9 611.5 807.2 1,191.0 1,265.6 1,207.1 
Non-oil Exports 104.5 121.6 109.6 134.6 176.6 191.0 202.7 
Non-oil Exports as % of GDP 6.7 6.2 6.8 6.8 7.0 6.9 7.2 
Merchandise Imports (CIF - SR billion) 338.1 431.8 358.3 400.7 493.4 583.5 630.7 
Trade Balance   (fob - SR billion) 564.9 795.1 394.6 576.4 917.8 924.6 835.2 
As  % Share of GDP-Nominal 36.2 40.8 24.5 29.2 36.6 33.6 29.8 
Current Account Balance (SR billion) 350.0 496.2 78.6 250.3 594.5 617.9 497.4 
As  % Share of GDP-Nominal 22.5 25.5 4.9 12.7 23.7 22.4 17.7 
Crude Oil Production (Million barrels/day) 8.8 9.2 8.2 8.2 9.3 9.8 9.6 
Average Price-Arabian Light (US$/barrel) 84.35 95.00 59.47 78.96 95.18 106.48 102.41 
Official Foreign Assets - Net  (SR billion) 1,347.7 1,888.1 1,777.6 1,948.4 2,334.6 2,771.9 3,062.0 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency  1,128.5 1,642.3 1,520.0 1,651.5 2,007.1 2,428.6 2,687.8 
Govt. Institutions & Independent Org. 219.2 245.8 257.5 296.9 327.5 343.3 374.2 
Exchange Rate (SR/US$) 3.750 3.750 3.750 3.750 3.750 3.750 3.750 
Money Supply M3 Growth (% change) 19.6 17.6 10.7 5.0 13.3 13.9 10.9 
Inflation Rate (2007=100) % change 5.0 6.1 4.1 3.8 3.7 2.9 3.5 
Saudi Share Price Index  (1985 =1000)1/ 11,038.7 4,803.0 6,121.8 6,620.8 6,417.7 6,801.2 8,535.6 
Source: MEP - Achievements of the Development Plans 31st Issue; CDSI - Labor Force Survey Bulletins; SAMA - Annual Report # 49, 
and 2nd Quarterly Statistical Bulletin 2014. Notes: r revised, p preliminary; * based on by kind of economic activity; 1/at year-end.   
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During the 8th five-year development plan (2005-2009) the average total Saudi 
revenues per year were around USD 200 billion. In 2010 the Saudi GDP was USD 435 
billion with a trade surplus of USD 154 billion and a budget surplus of USD 109 billion 
(SAMA, 2011). During the 9th five-year development plan (2010-2014) the Saudi 
government planned to invest USD 385 billion in infrastructure, health and education 
projects, while enjoying a USD 644 billion worth of foreign reserves by end of 2012, and 
government’s deposits in the central bank amounting to USD 405 billion, representing 
around 56 percent of GDP end of 2012 (Devaux, 2013). Real GDP growth averaged 
around 6.25 percent per annum during the period of 2008–2012, making Saudi Arabia third 
best behind China and India among the G20 member states (IMF, 2013a). On the other 
hand, the Saudi government’s solvency became stronger as public debt decreased from 
around 37 percent of GDP in 2005 to a low 2.7 percent in 2013. 
Government spending was rising with an average of 10 percent annually; and 
currently KSA has number of mega-projects with an average total worth of USD 784 
billion underway or in pipeline (Citi Research, 2014). In Sum, KSA economy enjoys a 
sound position with enough capital to invest and a list of ongoing mega-projects that could 
arguably create enough jobs in the market to absorb unemployment (Table 2) 
Table 2: Examples of Mega-Projects in KSA. (USD billion) 
Transport 
Jazan, Abha, and Al Qasim Airports 
King Abdulaziz International Airport 
Saudi Land bridge Railway 
Jeddah Monorail 
Phase One Mecca Mass Rail Transit Project 
 
10.7 
7.2 
7.0 
5.6 
5.3 
Energy and Utility 
16 Nuclear Reactors 
Ras Al Zour Combined Desalination and Power Plant 
Multi-effect Desalination Plant in Yanbu 
 
100.0 
5.0 
4.3 
 
Construction and Social Infrastructure 
Grand Mosque Expansion in Mecca 
Jubail refinery scheme 
University building projects 
 
21.3 
20.0 
20.0 
Source: Business Monitor International 
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However, as Saif and Abdul Khalek(2011) noticed; unemployment in the MENA 
region, in general, is structural in nature and not linked to cyclical factors; the link between 
economic growth and job creation is weak because growth is excessively reliant on oil 
sector. In addition, Hertog (2013) argued that economic activity in KSA is highly 
dependent on the state budget, pointing out that the share of private sector wages in GDP is 
less than 10 percent compared to 40-50 percent in mature economies. 
Although government spending is high as revealed by successive budgets 
throughout the past decade, especially on the education sector which averaged around 25 
percent of the total budget appropriations throughout the period of 2004 -2014 (Table 
3),yet, the private sector in KSA remained dependent on foreign labor. The latest census in 
2010 showed that the total population reached 27 million, out of which almost 8.5 million 
are foreign expatriates, and the rate of unemployment among them is only 0.8 percent 
(Kabbani & Kothari, 2005). According to the latest official figures the number of non-
Saudi population reached 9.36 million in 2012, compared to 6.15 million in 2004 (MEP, 
2013). This exponential increase in number of expatriates is antithetical to the goal of big 
investment by the Saudi government in the educational sector. 
Table 3: Total Expenditure on Education Sector through Fiscal Years 2004-2014 (USD billion) 
Fiscal Year 
Total 
Expenditure 
Percentage of total 
FY appropriations 
Percentage increase over 
previous FY 
2004 16.9 27 - 
2005  18.7 25 10 
2006 23.8 26 27 
2007 25.7 25 8 
2008 28 25 9 
2009 32.6 26 16 
2010 36.7 25 13 
2011 40 26 8 
2012 45 24 13 
2013 54.4 25 21 
2014 56 25 3 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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The spending of this exponential investment in the education sector as shown by 
(Figure 4) is mostly appropriated for construction projects of schools, universities and 
technical colleges. Investment in developing and improving educational curriculums was 
initiated under King Abdullah Project for General Education Development in addition to 
number of other programs and plans (US-SABC, 2009), however, reports on progress of 
such programs are not yet presented. Such investment in education is by default a long-
term strategy that does not answer to the nature of the current unemployment problem. 
Figure 4: Total Expenditure on Education Sector through Fiscal Years 2004- 2014 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
There is another downside to the continuous predicament of unemployment and 
high dependence on foreign labor; according to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) the value of remittances by foreign labor in 1985 was USD 5.1 billion, which 
represented around 10 percent of the GDP, and in 2007 remittances reached around USD 
16.2 billion, making Saudi Arabia the second largest country in terms of remittance 
outflow worldwide after the United States(Looney, 2004b). The causes of the outflow are 
related to domestic policies of restrict ownership of properties by foreign expatriates in 
KSA; forcing them to transfer assets abroad. 
In 2012, KSA became the 3rd largest country in the world in terms of remittance 
outflow with a value of USD 29.5 billion, which is double the value remitted in 2002 of 
USD 15.1 billion. Saudi was surpassed by both the United States and Russia respectively, 
however, the amount remitted in 2012 represented around 4.1 percent of GDP making 
Saudi ranked 8th country worldwide in terms of remittance outflow as share of GDP, 
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compared to both the U.S and Russia 0.3 and 1.6 percent remittance share of GDP (World 
Bank, 2013).  
Taecker (2003) argues that the if the money being remitted outside KSA was spent 
domestically instead, it will have greater effects as Saudis spend more than expatriates on a 
much wider basket of goods and services. According to his argument; the expatriate 
domestic expenditure multiplier is 0.8 which means that for every SAR 1000 an expatriate 
spends in the economy it produces SAR 450 in income through the circulation of money in 
the economy. On the other hand, the expenditure multiplier for Saudi national is around 2.5 
which means that each SAR 1000 spent by a Saudi generates an extra income of SAR 
1500. Moreover, he argues that expatriates remit one-half of their income, which implies 
that they earned in 1999 around $28 billion, and by taking into account the difference in 
expenditure multiplier between Saudis and foreign households, the total annual cost of 
relying on foreign labor would be around $47 billion in that year. 
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IV. Literature Review 
Saudization Program 
Saudization is defined as the replacement of the expatriate labor force with a 
trained and qualified local labor force in a planned manner (Al-Harbi, 1997) by imposing 
quotas on the private sector to hire more Saudis. The program started during the Fourth 
(1985-1990) and Fifth (1990-1995) five-year development plans when the government 
called for Saudization (Al-Dosary & Rahman, 2005). However, the program was only 
formalized during the Sixth development plan (1995-2000), which called for the 
assimilation of 659,000 Saudis into workforce and the replacement of 319,000 expatriate 
workers (Sadi & Al-Buraey, 2009). In general, the Saudization program focused on 3 main 
goals; first, to increase the employment of Saudi-nationals in the private sector. Second, to 
decrease the number of foreign workers in the private sector. Third, to recapture and 
reinvest the income flowing out of the country through remittances (Looney, 2004b). 
Accordingly there were number of steps which the Saudi government took; 
• A ministerial decree no. 50 issued in 1995 calling on private companies with 
over 20 employees to reduce expatriate workers by a 5percent rate every year, a 
number that amounts to 150,000. In addition, penalties were set for non-
compliance, which included denial of access to governmental support and freeze 
on renewal of new permit applications to hire foreign workers (Sadi & Al-
Buraey, 2009). 
• Also in the mid-1990s, the government created a job reservation project for 
Saudi-nationals by banning the employment of expatriates in over 20 
professions, mostly administrative jobs, and this ban increased to 34 areas of 
work. Moreover, an increase in fees that deals with foreign recruitment was set, 
channeling the money to special fund that aims at ‘nationalizing’ jobs. 
• The Seventh five year development plan (2000-2005) called for ensuring 
employment of 817,300 Saudis, 446,600 through Saudization of jobs and 
328,700 through job creation. It also affirmed that Saudis should occupy 25 
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percent of the jobs in the private sector, by setting a fixed quota for hiring Saudis 
in the private sector at 30percent with different time target to each sector. 
• The Centennial Fund was established in 2004 with a budget of USD 80 million, 
taking an initiative with the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA) to promote job creation through SME’s. In January 2006, the 
Centennial Fund aimed at helping young Saudi entrepreneurs establish 280 
projects, which would create more than 4,000 jobs during the next 5 years. 
• General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training 
(GOTEVT) was expected to train 300,000 young Saudis in technical and 
vocational areas within 3 years through its 75 institutions, which offers extensive 
courses in many professions in different fields including industry, commerce and 
agriculture (Al-Dosary & Rahman, 2005). 
• Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) was set up in 1999 with a budget 
of USD 1 billion to subsidize salaries of trainees and fresh employees upon the 
completion of their training programs. The HRDF supplies the private sector 
with 50 percent and 75 percent of the salary and training costs of Saudis for two 
years (Sadi & Al-Buraey, 2009). 
Also, the government introduced a “Saudization Certificate” (Shahadat Sau’ada) 
issued by MOL, which indicates a company’s compliance with the established quota rate 
of Saudization. This certificate has also been used as a method to limit transactions 
between the public and private sectors to those companies that conform to Saudization 
regulations. ARAMCO, for example, restricted its contract awarding to companies that 
abide by Saudization quotas, precisely 50 percent for companies in the services area, 35 
percent for construction companies, and 60 percent for importers and engineering offices 
(Al-Dosary & Rahman, 2005); similar approaches were applied by different ministries in 
their contract awarding process. 
In essence, the core features of the Saudization program were: first, a quota for 
employing Saudi nationals in the private sector. Second, stressing the sponsorship system 
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for non-nationals (Kafeel), which controls the mobility of expatriates by mandating the 
consent of the employer before a foreign labor can move to another company. Third, labor 
laws favoring Saudi-nationals by putting restraints on firing them. Fourth, reserving certain 
jobs for Saudi nationals. Fifth, subsidizing on-job training for Saudi nationals through the 
HRDF.  
This approach by the Saudi government aimed to force the private sector to carry part 
of the responsibility and burden of training young Saudis and qualifying them for the labor 
market. Yet, consideration should be given to the fact that the private sector admitted their 
inability and lack of experience to train and supervise young Saudi workers (Winckler, 
1997). This was revealed by the fact that; while the Sixth development plan (1995-2000) 
called for replacing 319,000 jobs held by expatriates with Saudi-nationals, what happened 
in reality is that instead of reduction the number of foreign workforce increased by 58,400 
(Looney, 2004b). Henceforth, the Saudization program registered low to moderate levels 
of success (Niblock & Malik, 2007).  
Such program that relies on interventionist measures through subsidies and 
regulations to incentivize the private sector to hire more Saudi nationals faltered because it 
works at cross-purposes with other government initiatives, such as expansion in high-wage 
public sector jobs (Looney, 2012). Moreover, as Mellahi(2007) noted; the private sector in 
KSA adheres to the hard interventionist approach of the government through the quota-
based system, rather than Saudization resulting from a normative approach. According to 
(IMF, 2013b) the largest increase in employment of Saudi nationals was in areas 
associated with and largely corresponds to the public sector, while in the construction 
sector – for example – which witnessed the largest increase in jobs, relatively few jobs 
went to Saudi nationals. 
In 2011, KSA took on tackling its labor market problem and solving the 
unemployment issue by reforming the Saudization program. A new unemployment benefit 
program (Hafiz) was introduced and provided unemployed citizens with a monthly 
allowance of SAR 2,000. In addition, a new minimum wage of SAR 3,000 per month 
(USD 800) was set for the public sector, which also catered as a de facto minimum wage 
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for the Saudi-nationals in the private sector. In addition, the government set out two new 
policies. First, a campaign in 2013 against illegal foreign workers in the country; by 
limiting their existence, the government sought to decrease the supply of foreign labor in 
the market. In addition, about 5 million expatriates regularized their work permits and stay 
in the country, and about 1 million left or have been deported. 
Second, and most importantly, a ministerial decree no. 4040 was issued in 2011 
reforming the Saudization quota system, by setting a new program known as Nitaqat 
(meaning: Bands or Ranges) by setting new employment quotas for hiring Saudis in the 
private sector. This new programs combines incentives to hire Saudis, as well as sanctions 
in case of non-compliance. Incentives included more flexibility in foreign labor mobility as 
well as flexibility in issuing more working visas. Sanctions, on the other hand, included a 
fee of SAR 2,400 (USD 640) per redundant expatriate worker and deprivation of renewing 
work permit of expatriates. 
The previous Saudization program divided the market into 11 activities, based on 
which, different quotas for these activities were applied. The new Nitaqat program is more 
custom-tailored to cater to the different circumstances of each economic activity as well as 
the size of companies. It abolished the mandatory 30 percent requirement for Saudization 
applicable to most entities in the previous system, and issued new Saudization percentages 
based on companies’ capabilities of employing Saudis and availability of local talent for 
such economic activity (Al-Hejailan, 2012). The new Nitaqat program divides the 
economic activities in the market into 45 activities, and the size of businesses into 5 
categories as follows; Conglomerates (3,000+ employees), Big Companies (500 – 2,999 
employees), Medium Companies (50 – 499 employees), Small Companies (10 – 49 
employees), and Micro Enterprises (9 employees or less). 
Hence, under the new program there are a total of 225 (45 x 5) categories under 
which businesses in Saudi Arabia could fall on. With this scheme companies are classified 
into four bands depending on their adherence to Saudization requirements of their 
category. The bands are divided in a traffic light system with premium, green, yellow and 
red bands. The first two represent compliance with the Saudization requirement, and will 
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receive benefits accordingly, while the last two are deemed non-compliant and will be 
subject to administrative sanctions and punitive measures, including a yearly levy on each 
extra expatriate worker above quota. Table 4 and Table 5 gives an example of the different 
Saudization requirements under the new program depending on the type of activity and 
size of company; accordingly each company is placed in a band that corresponds to its 
status. Currently micro sized business (9 employees or less) are exempted on ‘grace 
period’ from the Nitaqat scheme but must employ at least one Saudi national. These 
companies are placed in a white colored band. As revealed by both tables the Saudization 
requirements for construction companies, for example, is much less than the Saudization 
requirements for banking and financial institutions. 
Table 4: Nitaqat Saudization requirements for Construction companies (Percent) 
Business Size Red Yellow Green Platinum 
Small (10-49 0 - 1 2 - 4 5 - 20 ≥21 
Medium (50-499) 0 - 1 2 – 5 6 - 15 ≥ 16 
Large (500-2,999) 0 – 3 4 – 5 6 - 15  ≥ 16 
Conglomerates (3,000+) 0 – 4 5 – 6 7 – 13 ≥ 14 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
Table 5: Nitaqat Saudization requirements table for Financial Institutions (Percent) 
Business Size Red Yellow Green Platinum 
Small (10-49 0 - 9 10 - 29 30 - 79 ≥ 80 
Medium (50-499) 0 - 19 20 – 49 50 – 90 ≥ 90 
Large (500-2,999) 0 – 49 50 – 64 65 - 90  ≥ 90 
Conglomerates(3,000+) 0 – 49 50 – 64 65 – 90 ≥ 90 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
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The main official reference regarding employment efforts in KSA is the Saudi 
Employment Strategy, issued by ministerial decree no. 260 in 2009. The strategy stated 
vision is to provide adequate number of jobs with suitable wages to absorb Saudi job 
seekers, providing jobs with high value-added, developing national manpower, and 
developing Saudi human capital and raising productivity. To this end, the strategy outlines 
number of overall objectives: first, controlling unemployment in the short term within 2 
years, decreasing unemployment rate in the medium term within 3-5 years, and realizing 
competitive advantage for the national economy on the long term within 6-25 years (MOL, 
2009), The summary of the overall strategy is laid down as in (Table 6). The full cost of 
the strategy is not yet calculated, although it is estimated to around an initial annual 
funding requirement of USD 4 billion (ILO and OECD, 2011). 
Table 6: Summary of Saudi Employment Strategy, 2009 
 
Short Term 
(2 years) 
Medium Term 
(3-5 years) 
Long Term 
(6-25 years) 
Overall Objectives 
 
 
                  Interim Targets 
 
Controlling 
unemployment 
Reducing the 
unemployment 
rate 
Realizing 
competitive 
advantage for 
the national 
economy 
Realization of full 
employment 
Increasing 
employment rates 
Increasing the 
peace of growth 
in employment 
rates 
Realizing full 
employment 
Maintenance of durable 
increase in national 
manpower participation 
Increasing 
participation Rates 
Increasing the 
pace of growth 
in participation 
rates 
Achieving the 
highest possible 
level of 
participation 
rate 
Raising Saudi labor 
productivity to match the 
standards of productivity 
in advanced economies 
Increasing labor 
productivity 
Increasing pace 
of growth in 
labor 
productivity 
Reaching the 
highest possible 
level of labor 
productivity 
rate 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
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Labor-Market Distortion 
There is no doubt that an interventionist policy by the government in this aspect to 
correct a deficient labor market, as a general policy, could be beneficial both socially and 
economically. Yet the argument here is regarding the nature of such intervention and the 
nature of such deficiency in the market. Fakeeh(2009) argued that the Saudization program 
is deficient as a policy, since, without a targeted logistics and application, it provides little 
more than a short-term solution to unemployment. That is due to the fact that Saudization 
as a policy targets the symptom, which is unemployment, rather than focusing on the real 
problem; that is employability. Accordingly, employability refers to alignment of education 
and labor market needs, and the lack of equipping Saudi youth with soft and hard skills 
needed for the job market. 
In De Bel-Air(2014) account for migration trends in Saudi Arabia traces back the 
historical reasons behind the disconnection of labor recruitment from market needs, as the 
1973 oil boom era triggered massive migration of unskilled and semi-skilled cheap labor to 
cater to the massive infrastructure projects. Those migrants were brought on short-term 
contracts with no entitlement to social benefits and were used as in most case as means of 
distributing the wealth of oil-rent to citizens; who benefit from these migrants’ income or 
even trade in labor visas. 
In their study on sources of disconnect between growth and employment Saif and 
Abdul Khalek(2011) put forward number of points; first, reliance on oil as a source of 
growth in the region since oil is very capital-intensive and generates few jobs. Second, a 
bloated oversized public sector, with high public sector wages as percentage of GDP 
(Table 7). Third, an underdeveloped private sector that is subject to numerous constraints. 
Fourth, labor market inefficiencies such as mismatch between education and skills required 
by the labor market, and lack of regulations that increases mobility and flexibility in the 
labor market. 
According to Niblock and Malik(2007), a skilled, motivated and effective Saudi 
labor, which the private sector needs, is not available, or at least not sufficient. Further 
proposing the question: “Does the labor market provide the caliber and skills needed for a 
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successful economic development, at rates of pay which are competitive internationally?” 
However, there is another side to the issue often missed. Non-national labor average wage 
in Saudi is 3.6 times less than nationals, the average wage of foreigners is USD 266 per 
month while the average wage of Saudis is USD 966 per month (Knickmeyer, 2011), and 
this in turn affects the labor market by driving down overall wages and distorts 
competition between nationals and non-nationals. In its research, Hay Group (2012) found 
that nationals are paid 13 percent more than average market wages; putting pressure on 
private sector to comply with Saudization requirements. 
Table 7: Public Sector Wages to GDP, Public to Private Sector Ratio (Percent) 
 
Region Government Wages 
Percent GDP 
Ratio of Public to 
Private Sector Workers 
MENA 9.8 1.3 
Africa 6.7 1.0 
Latin America 4.9 0.9 
Asia 4.7 0.8 
OECD 4.5 0.9 
Europe and Central Asia 3.7 0.7 
Source: World Bank 
Analyzing the workforce in Saudi; Diwan and Girgis(2002) noticed that the public 
sector in Saudi Arabia hosts more than 27 percent of the Saudi workforce while the rate is 
14 percent within OECD countries; this due to the security and financial benefits provided 
by the public sector against the private sector. One suggestion put forward to deal with this 
imperative is to unify both sectors so as to encourage graduates to join the private sector, in 
addition, providing job security in the private sector. Moreover, they point to the 
deficiency in the labor market in terms of wage differential between Saudis and non-
Saudis, with the average difference in wages reaching up to 80 percent, thus, making 
expatriates more lucrative for hiring. 
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According to Hertog(2014c) The ratio of national to foreign wages in the GCC’s 
private sector is 2:1, and this gap persists when controlling for type of job and educational 
background, this in addition to the sponsorship system which prevents foreign workers 
from moving to a new employer without the consent of the current one; makes non-
national workers more attractive. 
In the period between 2011 and 2013 the Saudi economy created 699,199 jobs for 
both national and non-nationals, with an average growth of 6.6 percent (10.5 percent rate 
of growth for Saudis). However, 43 percent of these jobs were in the public sector 
(Sfakianakis, 2014a). Moreover, 1.5 million of the 2 million jobs created in the last four 
years went to non-Saudis (IMF, 2013a). On the other hand, Hertog(2013) points out that in 
2011, only less than 400,000 out of the 4 million expatriate-held-jobs in the private sector 
paid a wage more than USD 800, which equals the minimum wage set by the government 
for Saudi nationals at SAR 3,000. This means that at the current prevailing wages level, 
only very few positions and jobs Saudi nationals can apply to or compete for. Furthermore, 
Randeree(2012) notes that businesses find it difficult to retain Saudi employees after they 
have been trained as they are lured away by better paying companies once they have been 
trained. 
In 2011, Devaux(2013)argues that 844,000 Saudis were employed in the private 
sector out of a pool of 4 million employable Saudis. Thus, assuming private sector 
employment grows at a rate of 10 percent per annum (vs. 11.3 percent in 2011) and that the 
private sector maintains same structural profile of 11 percent private jobs held by Saudi 
nationals; then the private sector has an absorption capacity of only 84,000 nationals in 
comparison to 400,000 new entrants to the job market each year. This in turn, reveals the 
need to go beyond the standard measures of relying on natural growth rates of the job 
market. However, the quota system for hiring nationals put forth by the Saudi government 
had limited results up until 2011. The issue is not only reliant on job creation, 
Abouraia(2014) argues that most unemployed Saudis are unemployed by choice since jobs 
offered are not up to their expectation of wage and job satisfaction. 
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In his paper Kabli(2013) reviews the historical development of the Saudi labor 
market that led to the current deficiencies, pointing out that in the period of 1974-1984 
most expatriates were highly-skilled labor from developed countries on temporary project 
assignments. However, after the oil-boom era, local companies resided on cheap labor 
from developing countries, and the labor market depended on unskilled low-cost labor, 
thus, creating the deficiency in the labor market as it became harder for nationals to 
compete with non-nationals who were willing to work long hours for a lesser wage. 
According to Al-Dosary(2004) there are 17 factors behind low participation rates of 
Saudi nationals in the private sector, including factors pertaining to both labor market 
deficiencies and education gap; such as language skills and lower wages. On the other side, 
Mellahi and Wood(2001) argued that there are four reasons behind private sector resistance 
to Saudization, chiefly, labor cost and inability of Saudis to integrate in a multicultural 
work environment. 
Forstenlechner and Rutledge(2010) argue that the abundance of cheap and highly 
elastic labor created less motivation among businesses for investment in labor saving 
technologies, and hence, less incentive to hire nationals whose wages are higher. The 
mostly cheap and unskilled labor catered to rising standard of living for nationals but in 
return affected employment and productivity among nationals due to the imbalance created 
by huge dependency on expatriate workers. 
According to Shediac and Samman(2010) the GDP contribution per employee in the 
GCC is around USD 41,600 in comparison to Norway USD 128,695, another oil producing 
country. They point out that the unemployment problem in the GCC countries stems from 
set of structural problems, chiefly; the structure of the economy, the education system and 
labor policies. Such problems need a holistic approach to deal with, especially solving the 
disparity in labor market through new regulations.  
Examining labor market policies that are likely to expand hiring nationals in GCC 
countries Fasano and Goyal(2004) found that an effective labor strategy should focus on 
investment in human capital and institutional reform, in addition to creating a vibrant non-
oil sector, proposing number of solutions and policies to mitigate the current problem of 
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unemployment among nationals. Such solutions include; increasing the relative 
attractiveness of national employment in the private sector by reducing wage deferential 
between public and private sector, leveling the playing-field by reducing disparities in 
labor mobility between nationals and non-nationals, increasing the set of skills, facilitating 
improvement in productivity through investments in capital, and using price and market-
based intervention rather than quantity-based system through quotas as done currently. 
Due to the wage deferential between national and non-national labor, Sadi(2013) 
points out that some companies resorted to hiring unskilled and unqualified Saudi-
nationals just to fulfill the quota requirement on the assumption that they will not perform 
real work; such activity might be harmful to the economy on the long-term, despite it being 
a practice that conforms with Saudization requirements.  
The issue of national labor productivity was reiterated by Alhamad(2014b), 
concluding that new labor laws of the Saudization program will drive wages upward, 
however, with more Saudis entering the labor force there will be risk of decreasing 
productivity due to shrinking foreign labor force. 
Discussing the likely economic costs and burdens on private sector from the quota-
based system, Ramady(2013) points out that such system might result in harming 
economic growth as the dependence on the private sector increases in efforts to diversify 
the economy away from oil and gas. This point was further stressed by Peck(2014), 
mentioning that while compliance with the quota system was high, the costs were also 
significant as 11,000 firms had to shut down, and exit rate of companies increased by 50 
percent, in addition to decreasing total employment among surviving companies with total 
employment decreasing by around 418,000.   
Examining the labor market and the constraints on implementing the Saudization 
program, Mahdi and Barrirntos(2003) showed for instance that; while Saudis are 
concentrated in sectors such as defense and education, the expatriates in Saudi Arabia are 
concentrated in most of the other sectors in the economy such as construction, 
manufacturing, wholesale and retails. They point in their study to the importance of career 
development for Saudis in order to trigger effects of job-localization. 
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Labor market nationalization, points out Hertog(2012) has happened mostly “by fiat” 
through quotas and prohibitions; leading to rule avoidance and illegal practices instead of 
genuine national employment. He further points out that labor market segmentation makes 
large-scale job creation unattainable, since wage differentials between nationals and non-
nationals is large, and higher national labor mobility and labor rights makes them less 
attractive for employment. Concluding that a “labor market strategy based on prices rather 
than on administrative intervention, can re-integrate public and private labor markets, and 
sustainably increase productivity in both” arguing for increasing non-national labor prices 
and internally liberalizing the labor market. 
Identifying number of tension points in the Saudi labor market Al-Sheikh and 
Erbas(2013) mention that wage differentials lowers the competitiveness of Saudi-nationals 
in the private sector, while rigid foreign labor mobility distorts the market. They also 
mention that numbers of foreign workers could be adjusted to cyclical demands and market 
conditions, on contrary the Saudi population is growing rapidly. Concluding that the main 
distortion in the labor market has been the lack of sustainability in private sector wages, 
which has declined sharply in recent years while public sector wages increased, creating a 
distortion that results in high unemployment among nationals. 
Additionally, Mahdi (2000) studied the structure of labor market in Saudi Arabia; 
concluding that inequality in the application of the labor regulations between national and 
non-national workers has distorted the labor market and created a situation of monopsony, 
also arguing that Saudization of the labor market could be successfully applied to white-
collar employment, but that it will prove a challenge in blue-collar employment, especially 
in case of dirty and hazardous work. This last point constitutes an essential part of the issue 
of reducing unemployment in Saudi Arabia since most jobs held by foreign workers are 
concentrated in the blue-collar segment. Pointing out that in 1998 around 72 percent of 
Saudi male job seekers refused a chance to work in the private sector due to low wage 
levels, and 47 percent refused such chance due to poorer working conditions compared to 
public sector. 
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Finally, Achoui(2009)review of formal Saudi documents shows that Saudi faces 
number of challenges in its economy, mainly; high dependence on oil, high dependence on 
foreign labor, low rate of female participation in employment and weak link between 
education system output and the needs of economic sectors. And while the government 
embarked on number of human resource development, the study shows that these programs 
are not developed functionally or structurally in SMEs. 
Different studies show that the issue of unemployment in Saudi Arabia requires 
further investigation and study; Al-Dosary, Rahman, and Aina(2006) assert the need for 
comprehensive data on the nature and magnitude of unemployment in Saudi, in addition to 
the need for adequate consultation with all stakeholders including the private sector. They 
point out that data is not shared between fragmented government agencies, further, there is 
lack of cooperation between government and private sector as policies are set without 
consultation with stakeholders.  
The general issues with Saudi labor market requiring reforms were summarized by 
(IMF, 2013). First, the need to reform education and raise labor productivity, as well as 
increasing vocational and technical training and decreasing the mismatch between the 
educational system and labor market demands. Second, making employment quotas to hire 
Saudi-nationals more effective. Third, tackling issues pertaining to labor mobility of 
foreign workers and reforming the sponsorship system. Fourth, amending labor market 
policies and unemployment benefits to Saudi-nationals including training programs. Fifth, 
capitalizing on wage subsidies to nationals and solving wage differentials in the labor 
market. 
Education and Labor-Market 
In his Thesis, Goetz (2003) regards demographics as the first and utmost threat to 
Saudi Arabia due to high population growth coupled with stress on the economy from high 
unemployment rates. He also mentions the need to reform and restructure the education 
system in order to meet this challenge. Discussing this demographic challenge 
Forstenlechner and Rutledge(2011) point out that the ratio of national to non-national 
workers, with non-Saudis currently making up half the workforce in the country, creates a 
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‘demographic imbalance’. Further stating that; the cost of migration is becoming visible in 
terms of productivity, as Saudis are less productive today than the 1990s. 
Directing attention to the risks of political implosion if the unemployment challenge 
is not met; Bremmer(2004) stresses the need for an educated citizenry and reforming the 
education system in Saudi Arabia in order to succeed in the long-term reforms and create a 
needed knowledge-based society. Studies by Hertog(2012) and Al-Dosary and 
Rahman(2005) revealed a preference in employers to hire non-nationals since Saudi-
nationals are perceived as inexperienced and less productive, and that this trend persist 
even if wage differentials decreased, and thus, companies will only hire Saudi-nationals up 
to the required quota since they are less desirable.  
Education reform is one of the recurring issues correlated to the challenge of 
unemployment in KSA. Currently, 78 percent of female job seekers are university degree 
holders, Bosbait and Wilson(2005) concludes that education in Saudi Arabia does not 
appear to equip youth for employment. Additionally, Baqadir, Patrick, and Burns(2011) 
present evidence that a skill gap still exists between nationals and non-nationals especially 
in areas of vocational skills, Showing that vocational education fails to provide Saudis with 
sufficient skills and training needed for the market, and highlighting that the gap centers 
around three factors: work ethics, specialized knowledge and generic skills. 
Concluding from research that some school graduates in KSA are below reasonable 
level to continue university education; Alzu'be(2012) stresses the need to reform 
curriculums and teaching methods, in addition to investing in student training. Also, he 
points out the existence of a gap between university outputs and market needs; which 
requires balancing. A point which Sadi and Al-Buraey(2009) asserts as well, pointing out 
the “marked imbalance between labor market requirements and educational provisions, 
which is suggested by the graduation statistics for 2001” as over 80 percent of Saudi 
university graduates that year were in the social sciences and art disciplines, while 
graduates in medicine and other health related subjects comprised only 2 percent, the 
reminder 6.4 percent, 2.7 percent and 0.8 percent were in natural sciences, engineering and 
hospitality and tourism respectively. This point was further stressed by (JCCI, 2005) which 
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called for linking acceptance in universities with needs of labor market, increasing 
vocational and technical training and balancing quantity and quality in different 
educational levels. 
In his paper, Kabli(2013) points out that due to the historical development of the 
labor market; the educational system failed in managing to cope with the change in order 
to develop the productivity of the local labor. Thus, for example, instead of educating a 
national farmer on modern methods of farming with introduction of automation and 
mechanization; the state relied on importing low-paid unskilled labor to fill in the gap. This 
resulted in stagnating productivity while the competition between national and non-
national labor pushed Saudis outside the job market and led to unemployment and 
ballooning the public sector. This in turn, led to increasing demand on higher education 
certificates since the level of education rather than the quality of education or level of 
productivity is what determined wages. 
One factor that plays a huge role in the demand for education is the fact that 
education is free up to the university level; in addition the government pays a monthly 
allowance to Saudi university students of USD 300 per month. This incentivizes students 
to continue education rather than enter the labor market, and resulted in an exponential 
growth in university educated citizenry, and hence, university degree-holders 
unemployment. The Saudi government heavily subsidizes higher education to compensate 
for the skills deficit, with an estimated 800,000 Saudis enrolled in national universities, 
and more than 100,000 studying abroad on government scholarships. Surprisingly, for 
example, 90 percent of Saudis in prison are university degree-holders (Looney, 2012). 
The education deficit in KSA is twofold, first, the poor quality of education, 
especially in scientific fields. Second, there is a lack of technical and vocational education 
at a level corresponding to the needs of the market. The performance of Saudi students in 
subjects of math and sciences is very low, as presented by the various reports of the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Saudi 8th 
grade students registered a mean score of 332 in mathematics in 2003, below the 
international average of 467, and a mean score of 398 in sciences for the same grade and 
 year, also below the international average of 474 
score for 8th grade in mathematics decreased to 329, while the international average 
increased to 500. Scores in 2011, did not register any improvements; with an 8
student’s mean score in mathematics put at 394 against an international average of 500, 
and a mean score in sciences of 436 against an international average of 500
Saudi students showed minimal or no mathematical and science skills. Their results were 
quite striking when compared to Singapore which scored in both fields around 600. Such 
weak performance by Saudi students cannot be attributed to 
to the quality of the educational system itself. The average student to teacher ratio in KSA 
is 12 to 1; one of the lowest in the world; in comparison to other developed countries with 
better performing students. In South K
in Singapore is 24 to 1 (Figure 
Figure 5: Eight Grade Students Performance in Mathematics at Each Level
 Source: TIMSS, 2003. 
What statistics reveal in KSA is a distortion in supply and demand across education, 
with excess supply of Saudi
fields, against an excess of demand on skilled labors. The percentage of students ent
universities is higher than students opting for technical and vocational education, a scheme 
that persists in the GCC countries in general, and creates an inverted educational pyramid 
by which the majority of students, 80 percent in GCC, are in unive
community colleges, vocational or polytechnic schools (
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Figure 6: Breakdown of Post-Secondary Student Population 
  
 Source: OECD 
Although the Saudi government incurs huge expenses on higher education, the 
survival rates in national universities averages around 40 percent only. In comparison to 
other developed countries where the percentage of students completing their bachelor 
degree is 70 percent in Germany and 83 percent in the United Kingdom (OECD, 2005). In 
sum, the inefficiency in the education system results in pushing the majority of youth 
towards higher education, which costs the state heavy funds, only to end up with less than 
half graduating; mostly in fields not needed by the market. 
The other side of this problem is the lack of the much need technical and vocational 
training by the labor market in Saudi despite increased government funds for education. 
Describing this predicament Sfakianakis(2014b) points out that official data shows that the 
proportion of Saudis enrolled in universities is 78 percent, which is the highest in the 
world, compared to an average of 56 percent in OECD countries and less than 30 percent 
in Turkey. On the other hand only 9 percent of secondary school graduates enroll in 
vocational and technical training, compared to an average of 41 percent in OECD countries 
and 37 percent in Turkey. And while KSA spends on higher education 8 times what it 
spends on vocational training, OECD countries spend 2 times on average. Tellingly, 
Germany spends 0.99 and 0.73 percent of its GDP on higher education and vocational 
training respectively, while KSA spends 1.86 percent of its GDP on Education and a only 
0.23 percent on vocational training. Such imbalance leads to giving more weight to higher 
education on the expense of vocational and technical training, and hence, distorting the 
labor market. 
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In 2002, there were 30,060 students in the 17 existing technical institutes in Saudi, 
among which only less than 4,800 graduated; this is striking in comparison to 40 percent of 
the total national university student population taking Islamic studies (Bosbait & Wilson, 
2005). This mismatch between market needs and education is being reaped today with the 
fact that unemployed bachelor’s degree holders represent 46.2 percent of the total 
unemployment population. In addition, 90 percent of those who registered with the Hafiz 
Program for unemployment benefits have degrees in theoretical disciplines, while 95 
percent of females registered with Hafiz Program are bachelor’s degree holders 
(Sfakianakis, 2014b). 
The trend of mismatching education and labor market needs continues even with new 
initiatives such as the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP) initiated in 2005 to 
support massive scholarship endowments to young Saudi to pursue their higher education 
abroad at all level, as described by Alfawaz, Hilal, and Alghannam(2014) KASP lacks pre-
departure awareness of market needs and requirements. 
In his study on the status of vocational and technical education in KSA, Al-
Shammari(2009) points out to the mismatch between the General Organization for 
Technical Education and Vocational Training (GOTEVT) efforts and skill formation in 
vocational and technical colleges on one side, and needs of the private sector and labor 
market on the other hand. Recommending that GOTEVT role should be changed to “create 
industry- led training organizations to serve and link the outcomes of this skill formation 
organization to the employment needs of the labor market and to the needs of the economy 
in general”. 
The imbalance in the education that led to a distorted human capital development in 
KSA was a result of an imbalanced development plans across time. The structure of the 
government expenditures since 1970, since the first five years plan was initiated, and up to 
2014 (Table 8) shows clearly that the government invested heavily in infrastructure and 
economic resources on expense of human resources development (MEP, 2013). 
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Table 8: Structure of Government Expenditure 1970 – 2014 (Percent) 
Development Plans Infrastructure1 Economic 
Resources2 
Human 
Resources3 
Social and Health 
Services4 
Tota
l 
First Plan 1970-1974 41.3 27.9 20.5 10.3 100.0 
Second Plan 1975-1979 49.3 28.0 14.7 8.0 100.0 
Third Plan 1980-1984 41.1 30.7 18.4 9.8 100.0 
Fourth Plan 1985-1989 28.9 20.4 33.0 17.7 100.0 
Fifth Plan 1990-1994 21.8 10.0 48.3 19.9 100.0 
Sixth Plan 1995-1999 16.2 11.5 51.5 20.8 100.0 
Seventh Plan 2000-2004 12.6 11.2 57.1 19.1 100.0 
Eighth Plan 2005-2009 14.1 12.2 55.6 18.1 100.0 
Ninth Plan 2010-2014 14.6 15.8 50.6 19.0 100.0 
Notes: 1/ Transport, telecommunication services, public works, housing, and municipal affairs.  
2/ Agriculture, water and electricity, petroleum & mineral resources, and industrial services.  
3/ General education, higher education, technical & vocational training, science & technology. 
4/ Health care, social, youth and information services, and cultural activities. 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning.  
As shown in (Figure 7) proper investment in human resources sector started only 
during the sixth five year plan (1995-1999) when the problem of unemployment began to 
have an acute toll on the economy of the state. 
Figure 7: Structure of Government Expenditure1970 – 2014 
 
 Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning.  
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V. Research Methodology 
According to Niblock & Malik(2007) “the absence of an independent means of 
unraveling the realities behind the divergent statistics on employment make it impossible 
to arrive at an accurate figure for the composition of the Saudi labor force”. In addition, 
Flynn(2011) points out that ideally a thorough labor market dataset would originate from a 
single government agency, which is not the case in KSA. Adding that in 2007, The 
Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) reported a total labor force of 8.2 million, while 
the Ministry of Labor (MOL) reported a total legally registered labor force of 6.7 million. 
The difference arises from the fact that the MOL collects data on labors registered with the 
government, while the MEP collects data on all workers in the economy. 
The variations in official datasets were reiterated also by Hertog(2012) who points 
out that SAMA and the Central Department of Statistics and Information (CDSI) account 
for total number of foreigners in KSA in 2007 was at around 6.5 million, while the MOL 
reported 8 million foreigners. On the other hand, MOL reported, also in 2007, a number of 
770,000 Saudis in the private sector; while conversely; The General Organization for 
Social Insurance (GOSI) records put Saudis in the private sector at about 550,000. He also 
points out that CDSI figures show that numerical relationship of foreigners to locals has 
been constant since 1993, hinting that this means the data have been extrapolated rather 
than derived from survey results. 
There are number of government agencies that collect information related to labor 
force in KSA, such as the Ministry of Civil Service (MCS), which collects data on public 
sector employment, while GOSI collects data on private sector employment for social 
insurance purposes. Moreover, both the Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF) 
and Hafiz Program collect data on unemployment among Saudi-nationals. Finally, CDSI; 
which is housed in MEP, collects general data on the Saudi economy including the labor 
force, and actually have the longest running dataset; the Statistical Yearbook produced 
annually since 1975. 
Analysis will be mainly quantitative-descriptive based on official published results, 
and data collected on the labor market will include levels of employment and 
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unemployment, total labor-force structure, sizes of private sector companies, wage 
structures across different economic activities and professions for nationals and non-
nationals, percentages of Saudization across different economic activities and size of 
companies. Special emphasis will be given to understanding the role of education by 
comparing wage structure according to education level to both national and non-national 
labors. In addition, percentages of Saudization according to education across sectors for 
both national and non-national labor forces. Different data sets will be examined across 
each other or across years, with special attention to the data of the period 2011-2013, of the 
newly Saudization policy revived and reformed under Nitaqat program. 
The concept of unemployment will be not explored in this paper as pertaining to 
the definition of unemployment or the types of unemployment in the Saudi labor market. 
Statistics declared so far in KSA are not matured enough to the extent of defining 
unemployment across certain types, nor are the statistics released on quarterly basis 
depending on private sector performance. This thesis will accept the broad definition of 
unemployment in KSA as calculated by MOL. Moreover, unemployment figures will be 
based primarily on annual reports released by MOL, and this thesis will rely on that dataset 
for number of purposes: first, MOL represents the main government stakeholder in the 
unemployment issue, and thus, assessment of its efforts should be based on their primary 
figures. Second, labor affairs were originally part of the mandate of the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs up to 2004 when ministerial decree no. 27 was issued to create a 
separate Ministry of Labor, since then MOL has been collecting data specifically on the 
private sector and releasing it annually. Finally, this paper aims to assess the Saudization 
program; which runs under the auspices of MOL. 
Data analysis will be made only to the limitations of this research purpose. 
Attention will be paid to generic labor force data, and distinctions will be made between 
national and non-nationals. The set of data produced by MOL is divided along gender 
lines, but this paper will not consider gender variations in the analysis, as such analysis 
will require further investigation along sociological lines and gender-based studies. With 
no access to micro data; this research will depend on officially published results by MOL 
represented and stylized.  
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VI. Analysis of Saudization Program 
Status of Nitaqat 
The status of the Nitaqat program in 2011 (year of program initiation) presented in 
(Table 9) highlights a challenging trend; most of the companies in the non-compliant bands 
of red and yellow are SMEs. Excluding the micro companies which are exempted from the 
Saudization requirements; 68 percent of small companies and 49 percent of medium 
companies were in the red and yellow bands. On the other hand, 71 percent of large 
companies and 92 percent of conglomerates were in the green and platinum bands. Overall, 
excluding micro companies, 65 percent of KSA companies were non-compliant with 
Saudization requirements per the Nitaqat program in 2011 (MOL, 2011). 
In both years, 2012 and 2013 (Table 10) and (Table 11) the status of Nitaqat shows 
improvement as more companies moved from the red and yellow bands into the green and 
platinum bands. In 2012, the companies in red band decreased from 120,599 to 67,769, and 
the companies in the yellow band decreased from 40,341 to 37,611 (MOL, 2012). Same 
trend continued in 2013, with red band companies decreasing from 67,796 to 17,314, and 
yellow band companies decreasing from 37,611 to 19,637 (MOL, 2013). However, as both 
tables show, SMEs kept on representing around 99 percent of companies in both red and 
yellow bands throughout the period of 2011 to 2013. On the other hand, most of the large 
and conglomarate companies were placed in the green and platinum category for the same 
period, and by 2013, more than 95 percent of the large and conglomarate companies were 
placed in both the green and platinum bands. 
SMEs, as theoretically, the creators of jobs were in mostly in non-compliance due 
to the cost associated with hiring nationals and their lack of skill sets which does not meet 
the requirements of SMEs. The Saudization regulation weakens SMEs, however on the 
contrary, big companies and conglomerates can afford to hire the nationals as well as train 
them for the job. 
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This highlights that the role of SMEs is under-utilized; as pointed out by 
Looney(2004a) SMEs in KSA represent 93 percent of total enterprises and account for 
only 24.7percent of total employment. In comparison to the United Kingdom, SMEs 
represent 99.9 percent of the private sector and 59.1 percent of employment. As matter of 
fact, numbers of different reports show that SMEs play a decisive role in creating more 
jobs in the economy. According to (De Kok, et al., 2011) between 2002 and 2010, 85 
percent of total employment growth in the European Union was attributable to SMEs, 
which have higher employment growth rate than large enterprises. 
In addition, one of the major challenges facing SMEs in KSA is the lack of 
financing. The credit gap for financing SMEs in the MENA region is around USD 240 
billion, while only 2 percent of bank lending in Saudi Arabia goes to SMEs (Saleem, 2013) 
with high interest rates that reach 20-25 percent. Saudi banks are conservative when it 
comes to lending SMEs with very strict criteria for lending, further limiting SMEs growth 
opportunities and reaching its potential for job creation. According to the above tables, 
SMEs – including micro businesses – represent around 99 percent of total businesses in 
KSA, while only accounting for 49 percent of total employment and 33 percent of total 
GDP, which is below global average of 64 percent for employment and 47 percent for 
GDP (MOL, 2014). As shown by official data (Table 12), SMEs employ 59.9 percent out 
of the total population of Saudi-nationals in the private sector, while on the contrary; they 
employ 72.2 percent out of the total non-national workers population in the private sector. 
Table 12: Number of Employees in Private Sector by Size of Company and Nationality, 2013 
Size Nationals Non-Nationals Total 
Micro 147,308 1,428,372 1,575,680 
Small 311,232 2,198,838 2,510,070 
Medium 420,672 2,310,428 2,731,100 
Large 294,549 1,149,656 1,444,205 
Conglomerates 293,092 1,125,488 1,418,580 
Total 1,466,853 8,212,782 9,679,635 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
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The status of the Nitaqat program shows that the government’s efforts are paying 
off as presented in (Table 13), the total number of companies in the red band, for example, 
decreased by 43.8 percent between 2011 and 2012,while the total number of companies 
increased in the green band by 82.6 for the same period. While this trend is clear in (Table 
13), one point of important consideration is the change within the white band, which 
represents the micro companies exempted from the Saudization requirements. The amount 
of micro companies increased between 2011 and 2012 by 10 percent, and then decreased 
by 11.15 percent between 2012 and 2013.  
MOL explains the decrease in number of micro business between 2012 and 2013, 
as due to a revision of the number of inactive micro entities in the market (MOL, 2013). 
What this reveals is that after the initiation of the Nitaqat program, many companies 
resorted to shirking practices by which they have opened new micro businesses to be 
eligible to import more foreign workers without affecting their Nitaqat status. According to 
labor laws, a micro company is allowed to import 4 expatriates provided they have one 
registered Saudi-national, either the business owner or a hired worker. It could be argued 
that the Nitaqat program had, in effect, helped through its system of incentives and 
sanctions in increasing the level of Saudization in companies. Nevertheless, (Table 
13)reveals also that the monitoring cost of such system is very high, as many companies 
resort evasion practices. 
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 Unemployment and Labor Force
In 2011, the Saudi-nationals represented 10.85 percent of the labor force in the 
private sector (Table 14), which is quite low in
Nitaqat Program paid off as the number of Saudi
in the period of 2011-2013 by more than 600,000. Between 2011 and 2012, the total 
number of Saudis employed in the private
6 percent for non-nationals. Same trend continued between 2012 and 2013 as the number 
of Saudis increased by 29.28 percent against 11.69 percent for non
Figure 8: Increase in National and Non
Source: Ministry of Labor, 2013
By 2013, the percentage of Saudi
sector reached 15.15 percent, 
for 2012 and 2013 respectively. Although the percentage of Saudi
private sector was higher than the percentage of non
amount of increase in non-nationals was almost double that of Saudi
Figure 9: Amount Increase in National and Non
Source: Ministry of Labor, 2013
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 comparison with international average. The 
-nationals in the private sector increased 
 sector increased by 34.36 percent against a low 
-nationals (
-National Employment 2012-2013 
 
 
-nationals out of the total labor force in the private 
with a Saudization rate of increase by 2.52 and 1.78 percent 
-nationals increase in the 
-national increase; cumulatively, the 
-nationals (
-National Employment 2012
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As shown in (Table 14) the total number of private sector employees is 9.6 million, 
and the private sector labor force has been expanding rapidly, with 9.7 percent increase in 
total labor force between 2011 and 2012, and another 14 percent increase between 2012 
and 2013. The latest increase alone amounts to 1.1 million new jobs, a figure higher than 
total new jobs held by Saudis since the initiation of Nitaqat in 2011. Job creation, as a 
matter of fact, is not the problem that leads to unemployment among Saudi-Nationals.  
Unemployment has been hovering throughout the past decade around the 10 
percent figure, as (Table 15) shows; the number of unemployed Saudis increased from 
228,625 in 1999 to 622,533 in 2013. The Nitaqat program managed to decrease 
unemployment rate since it started from 12.4 percent in 2011 to 11.7 percent in 2013; yet, 
this is still higher than the unemployment rate of 1999, which was only 8.1 percent (Figure 
10). Meaning that at the end result, total Saudi unemployment rate did not decrease despite 
slight success of Nitaqat program since its initiation in 2011. 
Figure 10: Total Unemployment Rate among Saudi-Nationals 1999-2013 
 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, 2013 
The increase in unemployment rate in the last decade could be attributed to the 
large influx of female job seekers, the data show that male unemployment percentage was 
stagnant around 6-7 percent, while female unemployment rate doubled from 15.8 percent 
in 1999 to 33.2 percent in 2013 (Figure 11) and the amount of unemployed females rising 
from a 100,000 less than the unemployed male population to 100,000 more than the 
unemployed male population (Figure 12). Stagnant unemployment rate could be attributed 
to the influx of national female population into the labor market; however, as revealed by 
the data, male unemployment has also been stagnant. Thus, hinting that gender related 
issues pertaining to the labor market could only explain the increase in female 
unemployment; not the stagnation in male unemployment. 
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Figure 11: Saudi Male – Female rates of Unemployment, 1999-2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, 2013 
Figure 12: Amount of Saudi Male – Female Unemployment. 1999 – 2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, 2013 
The manpower survey for the period of the Nitaqat Program, 2011-2013 (Table 16) 
is quite revealing on the reasons behind this stagnation in rates of unemployment despite 
the efforts by the government. Between 2011 and 2013, the total number of employed 
Saudis increased from 4.1 to 4.7 million. This reflects an increase rate of 5.8 and 7.3 
percent in 2012 and 2013 respectively, making the percent of employed Saudi-nationals in 
the economy at 35.7 percent. However on the other side, the labor force itself increased by 
almost a similar percentage of 5.4 and 6.8 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. So, in effect, 
despite the fact that unemployment rate decreased by 3.3 percent in 2013, the total number 
of unemployed Saudis in the economy increased by an equal percentage of 3.3 percent to 
reach 622,533 in 2013 from 585,727 in 2011; keeping the percentage of total unemployed 
nationals at around 4.7 percent out of the total labor force. 
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 The structure of KSA manpower is self
increasing, the labor force is also increasing by a similar rate; thus, keeping unemployment 
percentages stagnant (Figure 
working age population in 2011 and increased to 40.4 percent in 2013. The Saudi labor 
force is expanding by a rate equal to the rate of employment, hence; the labor market will 
always run a deficit in amount of Saudis unemp
within a set range. 
Figure 13: Rate of Nationals Employment Growth vs. Rate of Nationals Labor Force Growth
Source: Ministry of Labor, 2013
The manpower survey reveals also that the total S
years) is 13.2 million in 2013; however, more than half of that population is out of the 
labor force, 62.3 percent in 2011 and 59.6 percent in 2013 amounting to 7.8 million. This 
could be attributed to number of reasons; am
KSA rather than a problem of unemployment. Examining the breakdown of the out of 
labor force population by age and reason for being out of the labor force (
number of points. 
Firstly, that the majority of the population out of the labor force are either students, 
or in housekeeping position; which mainly refers to housewives not willing to work, with 
39 and 50 percent respectively (
the age working population, those between 15 and 24 years of age precisely, is around 2.9 
million, which hints that the labor force is to witness exponential increases with time. The 
last published detailed national census of 2004 draws a clear picture of the population 
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structure with majority of population falling between 1- 24 years (Figure 15). Moreover, as 
(Table 1) shows the total Saudi population is put at 20.27 million, while the Saudi 
population above 15 years is 13.20 million (Table 16), which means that around 35 percent 
of the Saudi population is under 15 years, compared to 18 percent in industrial countries 
(Al-Sheikh & Erbas, 2012). 
Figure 14: Saudi Out of Labor Population by reason, 2013 
  
Source: CDSI Labor Force Survey, 2013 
Figure 15: Saudi Population Distribution by Age Group, 2004 
 
Source: CDSI Census, 2004 
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Labor Market Structural Deficiencies 
The Saudi labor market suffers from number of structural deficiencies resulting 
from market segmentation; as there are actually two labor markets in KSA, one for the 
nationals and another for the non-nationals. In addition, another segmentation exists 
between nationals in the public sector and nationals in the private sector. This structural 
inefficiency is visible in the wage differential between, nationals and non-nationals in the 
private sector, one the first hand, and among nationals themselves in the public and private 
sector, on the other hand. Also, such inefficiency is visible in the labor productivity rates 
of employees in both sectors, as well as in the education sector. 
Another inefficiency is the information asymmetry in the regulatory environment; 
creating an ‘Agency Cost’ where the agent (private companies) are able to determine the 
cost of non-compliance; hence, circumventing regulations (Weimer & Vining, 2011). As 
shown above in comparison between status of Nitaqat Program for the period 2011-2013 
(Table 9), (Table 10) and (Table 11). Companies resort to shirking practices that allows 
them to access government benefits and avoid penalties through; creation of micro-
companies that allows them to import labors and bypass quota requirements since these 
companies are currently exempted from the Nitaqat Program. Otherwise, creating sub-
companies in activities where Saudization targets are easily achievable and using imported 
labors in these activities for other jobs. Moreover, companies might resort to hiring Saudis 
just to meet the Saudization requirement while expecting those nationals to do nothing; 
which leads to deterring genuine employment and creates what came to be known as fake 
or phantom Saudization; Saud’a Wahmiya. 
Wage Differentials 
In 2011, the average monthly wage for a Saudi-national was SAR 2,889, while the 
average wage for a non-national was SAR 1,022 (Table 18), thus, wages of nationals are 3 
times higher on average than non-nationals. This discrepancy in wages makes Saudi-
nationals more expensive and less attractive to hire by the private sector. 
 Table 18: Average Wages (SAR/Month) in Private Sector by Nationality 2011
 
Nationality 
Nationals
Males Females 
Wage 3,635 2,142 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
This wage differential between nationals and non
in educational level, and across different economic activities in the labor market (
16). The wage differential cre
an economic force that results in disequilibria. It could be traced to number of reason. 
First, the sponsorship system (
residency permit to the sponsoring employer whose consent is required for a worker to 
change employer; thus, weakening the relative bargaining position of expatriates vis
the employers. 
Figure 16: National Vs. Non
Source: MOL in(Hertog, 2012) 
Second, around 74 percent of expatriates in Saudi Arabia originate from Five 
specific countries; India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines and Egypt (
comprising 6,717,658 out of an immigrant population of 9,717,658 
Laborers from these countries are mostly considered low skilled and low
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 Non- Nationals 
Average Males Females Average Males Females
2,889 748 1,295 1,022 982 1,676
-nationals exists despite similarity 
ated by the structural inefficiencies in the labor market of is 
Kafeel) reduces the mobility of foreign labor by tying 
-National Monthly Wages by Profession, 2007 
(UNDESA, 2013)
-paid, and hence, 
Total 
 Average 
 1,239 
Figure 
-à-vis 
Figure 17), 
. 
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willing to accept lower wages and longer working hours which still makes a higher earning 
than in their home countries. 
Figure 17: Percentage of Expatriates in Saudi Arabia by Nationality (2013) 
 
Source: UNDESA. 
Third, reservation wage for Saudi-nationals is increasing due to number of reasons, 
among them the unemployment benefit issued by the Hafiz Program which equals SAR 
2,000 per month for a year of unemployment, while the minimum wage set by the 
government is SAR 3,000 per month; this in turn creates a moral hazard. Also, the 
imbalance between the public and private sectors, where wages, benefits, job-security and 
better working conditions for nationals are higher in the public sector; thus, pushing Saudi 
youth to a longer period of ‘wait-hood’ in anticipation for job opening in the public sector.  
In addition, other socio-economic factors, such as high dependency ratio among 
Saudis; an average of six dependents, sheds light on reasons behind high reservation wage 
(Hertog, 2012). According to Ramady(2010) Saudi dependency rate is 2.4 times the world 
average. This dependency is compounded by the fact that inflation in KSA is relatively 
high at an average of 4.3 percent in the period of 2007-2011; however, inflation is much 
higher when examined across main groups of the living costs as inflation for same period 
was 6 percent for the food and beverages and 8.6 percent for housing, water, electricity and 
gas (SAMA, 2013). According to Alhamad(2014a) inflation in Saudi Arabia is not visible 
India
19%
Pakistan
15%
Philippines 
11%Bangladesh
15%
Egypt
14%
Other Countries
26%
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when looking at the general Consumer Price Index (CPI), but rather when examining the 
groups and subgroups affecting peoples’ cost of living such as food and rent.  
As shown by Table 19 the average wages for Saudi nationals is higher than the 
average wages of non-nationals across different economic activities, with Saudi wages 
especially high in capital-intensive activities such as Finance, water, electricity and gas, 
petroleum and mining, and insurance (Figure 18). The non-national wages brings down the 
total average wage structure in the economy; thus; creating a disincentive for Saudis to 
replace non-national jobs at the current rate of wages. When examined against each other; 
(Figure 19) shows that percentage of Saudization is higher when the average wage of 
Saudis is high also. Thus, Saudization is aligned with wage levels. As noticed by 
Hertog(2014a) the narrower the wage gap between nationals and non-nationals in 
professions, the higher is the Saudization ratio (Figure 20). Such correlation implies that 
without government intervention on labor prices or quantitative supply; Saudization will 
remain difficult to attain. 
There are currently three different fees levied on private sector employers under 
Saudization rules. First, a work permits of SAR 100 per year per foreign laborer. Second, a 
residence permits of SAR 500 per year per foreign laborer. Third, a HRDF charge of SAR 
150 per year per foreign laborer, for nationals training purposes. Yet, it should be noted 
that the average earning of a non-national is SAR 12,400 per year, thus, it seems that an 
annual fee of SAR 750 is a cost most private sector firms are willing to internalize since it 
only represents a 6% of the average non-national income, which is too small of an amount 
to alter the behavior of the private sector provided that a Saudi-national wage is three times 
higher than the average non-national wage. 
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Figure 18: Average Salary in the Private Sector according to Economic Activity 2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013 
 
Figure 19: Average Saudi Wages vs. Percentage of Saudization across Economic Activity 2013 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013 
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 Figure 20: Saudization ratios vs. wage ratios of different professions (2010)
Source :(Hertog, 2014a) 
Currently, as (Table 20
percent of the total private sector employment, building and construction, and, wholesale 
and retail trade, with 48 and 20 percent respectively (
percentage of Saudization in each economic activity is examined against percentage of 
total private sector employment in these economic activities (
activities with high wages enjoy
a lesser share in the employees market since they are mostly capital
Figure 21: Distribution of Employment in the Private Sector by Economic Activity 2013
  Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013
Building and 
Construction
48%
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade
20%
Social and 
Personal Services
9%
57 
 
 
) shows, there are two economic activities that compose 68 
Figure 21). However, when the 
Figure 22), it is clear that 
 high levels of Saudization. However, these activities have 
-intensive in nature. 
 
Agriculture, Forest
ry and Fishing
7%
Manufacturing
9%
Transportation 
and Storage
3%
Water, Electricity Petroleum and 
Mining
1%
Finance, Insurance
, Real Estate and 
Business
2%
Other
4%
 
 
and Gas
1%
58 
 
Figure 22: Saudization vs. Total Private Sector Employment by Economic Activity 2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013 
Comparing the total number of national and non-national employees in the private 
sector across different economic activities reflects this trend (Figure 23) as the graph 
shows that the greatest variation in number of Saudis against foreigners is in the activities 
of construction and trade, where the deflection points are visible. 
Figure 23: Number of Saudis vs. Foreigners in Private Sector by Economic Activity 2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Total Employment
Saudization 
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
4,500,000
Saudis
Foreigners
5
9
 
 Ta
bl
e 
20
: 
Em
pl
o
ym
en
t i
n
 
Pr
iv
a
te
 
Se
ct
o
r 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
A
ct
iv
ity
 
(20
13
) 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
A
ct
iv
ity
 
Sa
u
di
 
N
at
io
n
al
s 
N
o
n
-
Sa
u
di
 
N
at
io
n
al
s 
To
ta
l A
v
er
ag
e 
Pe
rc
en
t 
Sa
u
di
s 
M
a
le
s 
Fe
m
a
le
s 
To
ta
l 
Pe
rc
en
t 
M
a
le
s 
Fe
m
a
le
s 
To
ta
l 
Pe
rc
en
t 
M
a
le
s 
Fe
m
a
le
s 
To
ta
l 
Pe
rc
en
t 
B
u
ild
in
g 
an
d 
Co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
35
8,
70
9 
12
3,
81
4 
48
2,
52
3 
32
.
90
 
4,
15
2,
59
6 
41
,2
40
 
4,
19
3,
83
6 
51
.
06
 
4,
51
1,
30
5 
16
5,
05
4 
4,
67
6,
35
9 
48
.
31
 
10
.
32
 
So
ci
al
 
an
d 
Pe
rs
o
n
al
 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
96
,7
54
 
90
,8
47
 
18
7,
60
1 
12
.
79
 
56
6,
66
5 
80
,1
06
 
64
6,
77
1 
7.
88
 
66
3,
41
9 
17
0,
95
3 
83
4,
37
2 
8.
62
 
22
.
48
 
A
gr
ic
u
ltu
re
,
 
Fo
re
st
ry
 
an
d 
Fi
sh
in
g 
12
,7
45
 
4,
38
7 
17
,1
32
 
1.
17
 
63
1,
53
6 
1,
74
7 
63
3,
28
3 
7.
71
 
64
4,
28
1 
6,
13
4 
65
0,
41
8 
6.
72
 
2.
63
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
13
7,
62
3 
38
,9
24
 
17
6,
54
7 
12
.
04
 
72
0,
63
4 
19
,5
77
 
74
0,
21
1 
9.
01
 
85
8,
25
7 
58
,5
01
 
91
6,
75
8 
9.
47
 
19
.
26
 
W
at
er
,
 
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
 
an
d 
G
as
 
33
,5
50
 
38
8 
33
,9
38
 
2.
31
 
12
,2
03
 
28
 
12
,2
31
 
0.
15
 
45
,7
53
 
41
6 
46
,1
69
 
0.
48
 
73
.
51
 
Fi
n
an
ce
,
 
In
su
ra
n
ce
 
an
d 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
63
,3
74
 
12
,9
53
 
76
,3
27
 
5.
20
 
11
0,
18
8 
1,
96
8 
11
2,
15
6 
1.
37
 
17
3,
56
2 
14
,9
21
 
18
8,
48
3 
1.
95
 
40
.
50
 
Pe
tr
o
le
u
m
 
an
d 
M
in
in
g 
67
,7
51
 
2,
00
7 
69
,7
58
 
4.
76
 
20
,4
56
 
2,
18
2 
22
,6
38
 
0.
28
 
88
,2
07
 
4,
18
9 
92
,3
96
 
0.
95
 
75
.
50
 
Tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
 
an
d 
St
o
ra
ge
 
56
,9
35
 
9,
47
1 
66
,4
06
 
4.
53
 
26
7,
69
7 
1,
59
7 
26
9,
29
4 
3.
28
 
32
4,
63
2 
11
,0
68
 
33
5,
70
0 
3.
47
 
19
.
78
 
W
ho
le
sa
le
 
an
d 
R
et
ai
l T
ra
de
 
24
0,
07
7 
11
5,
59
0 
35
5,
66
7 
24
.
25
 
1,
56
7,
18
6 
12
,9
43
 
1,
58
0,
12
9 
19
.
24
 
1,
80
7,
26
3 
12
8,
53
3 
1,
93
5,
79
6 
20
.
0 
18
.
73
 
O
th
er
s 
79
7 
15
7 
95
4 
0.
07
 
2,
23
3 
 
23
3 
0.
03
 
3,
03
0 
15
7 
3,
18
7 
0.
03
 
29
.
93
 
To
ta
l  
1,
06
8,
31
5 
39
8,
53
8 
1,
46
6,
85
3 
10
0.
0 
8,
05
1,
39
4 
16
1,
38
8 
8,
21
2,
78
2 
10
0.
0 
9,
11
9,
70
9 
55
9,
92
6 
9,
67
9,
63
5 
10
0.
0 
15
.
15
 
Pe
rc
en
t o
f T
o
ta
l b
y 
G
en
de
r 
11
.
71
 
71
.
18
 
15
.
15
 
 
88
.
29
 
28
.
82
 
84
.
85
 
 
94
.
22
 
5.
78
 
10
0.
0 
 
 
So
u
rc
e:
 
M
in
ist
ry
 
o
f L
a
bo
r,
 
A
n
n
u
a
l L
a
bo
r 
St
a
tis
tic
s 
20
13
 
60 
 
Although capital-intensive economic activities registered higher Saudization 
percentages; when it is examined against percentages of Saudis in each economic activity 
out of the total Saudi population in the private sector (Figure 24), two deflection points 
occur in construction and trade; further pointing to the fact that these activities retain a 
higher ability to absorb more nationals. Both of these activities have a higher percentage of 
Saudis out of the total Saudi population in the private sector, despite lower wages (Figure 
25). If wages were to be higher in these activities, it might attract more Saudis and become 
a locus for more national employment. 
Figure 24: Saudization vs. Number of Saudis out of Total Saudi Private Sector Population 2013 
 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013 
Figure 25: Average Saudi Wage vs. Number of Saudis out of Total Saudi Private Sector Population 2013 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2013 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Out of Total 
Saudis in Private 
Sector
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
Average Saudi Wage Out of Total Saudis in Private Sector
 Public vs. Private Sector 
According to data from the late 1990s pre
average wage in public sector is higher than the private sector on all levels of education 
(Figure 26). This is due to increases in public 
sector wage decreased over time. In addition, public sector employees enjoy number of 
fringe benefits: better job security and less working hours than the private sector, creating 
in return segmentation in the labor 
The public sector wage bill in KSA absorbed around 50 percent of current 
expenditures and around 30 percent of oil exports on average du
2010 (Al-Sheikh & Erbas, 2013)
pegging, the remaining macroeconomic management tool is fiscal policy in the GCC 
countries. Heavy reliance on oil revenue for budgetary financing is where the oil curse 
becomes much more visible because budget is the main cond
citizens in which the main channel of transfer is the government sector wage bill”.
Figure 26: Civil Service and Public Sector Monthly Wages, late 1990s (USD 1 = SAR 3.75)
Source: World Bank, MEP, 2002 in
The exponential increase of public sector employment, as the number of public 
sector employees almost doubled since 1994, coupled with a wide gap in wages between 
public and private sector created
wait-hood period of nationals in anticipation for a public sector job, as well as solidifying a 
disincentive for private sector jobs among Saudis.
61 
sented by Diwan and Girgis
sector wages, while the average private 
market. 
ring the period of 2003 
: “Without active monetary policy because of currency 
uit of transferring oil rents to 
(Diwan & Girgis, 2002) 
 segmentation between both that caters to increasing the 
 
(2002) the 
– 
 
 
 
 Labor Productivity 
Labor productivity is actually on
market. As a matter of fact, labor productivity has 
(Figure 27) output per private sector employee has decreased with the incr
of foreign workers. According to 
of high and mid-skilled expatriates with low
KSA economy shrank upon falling global oil prices.
Figure 27: Non-Oil Private Sector Productivity Rates, against Number of Foreigners 1974
Source: CDSI, SAMA in (Hertog, 2012)
Measured against GDP growth; 
relationship to GDP developments and growth rate, as shown in (
that reliance on expatriates was created by a structural inefficiency in the labor market
Figure 28: GDP against Number of Foreigners 1974
Source: CDSI, SAMA in (Hertog, 2012)
62 
e of the structural inefficiencies in the labor 
in overall declined in KSA, as shown in 
ease in number 
Hertog(2012) this was due to the large-scale substitution 
-skilled cheap labor during a period in which 
 
 
the number of foreign workers in KSA has no 
Figure 28). This suggests 
-2007 
 
-2007 
. 
 The decline in productivity was a trend in both public and private sectors, as is tied 
up to what Hertog(2012) describes as “the institutionalization of a segmented labor market 
in the 1980s”. More Saudi-nationals were given guaranteed public sector employment as 
part of the rent seeking practice created by the state. T
between public and private sectors, as public wages were higher than the private sector 
wages that relied on foreign cheap labor. This in turn, increased the reservation wage of 
nationals; creating a disincentive to work fo
to overstaffing in public sector and reduction of public sector productivity, on the other 
hand, as shown in (Figure 29).
 In addition, as Hertog(2012)
also undermined incentives for Saudi business to invest in technology and management 
structures with a view to enhancing productivity per laborer, creating a vicious cycle of 
low-margin production vs. low
economy suffers from feeds the structural inefficiency of the labor market, making it 
harder for Saudization efforts to incubate in such working environment that dependence on 
cheap low-skilled labor for production. 
Figure 29: Public Sector Productivity Rates, against Number of Public Employees 1974
Source: CDSI, SAMA in (Hertog, 2012)
 
The use of technology in pro
in the economy. So far, KSA’s
63 
his resulted in widening the gap 
r the private sector, one the one hand, and led 
 
 puts it: “The availability of cheap, unskilled labor has 
-margin workforce”. The low productivity that KSA 
 
 
duction is representative of higher labor productivity 
 share of high technology exports is very minimal compared 
-2007 
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to other countries and regions, 0.55 percent of total Saudi manufacturing exports compared 
to 16 percent in OECD countries (Figure 30). The Saudi private sector relies on simple 
technologies with minimum to no innovation. The research and development (R&D) 
expenditure in the GCC is around 0.1 percent of GDP compared to an average 2 percent of 
GDP in OECD countries (Hertog, 2014b). The dependence on low-skilled cheap labor 
affected the average productivity of the Saudi economy, driving the private sector to rely 
on more low-paid laborers to increase productivity in a labor-intensive manner, instead of 
investing in cost-effective technologies that increases labor-productivity in a capital-
intensive manner. 
Figure 30: Share of hi-tech exports in total manufacturing exports for number of countries in 2011 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Education and Labor Force 
As mentioned above, the educational pyramid is inverted in KSA with more 
nationals graduating from higher-education institutions than from vocational and technical 
training institutions. As shown in (Table 21), the growth percentage of higher education 
graduates surpassed even the growth percentage of secondary level graduates, with 13.5 
and 11.4 percent respectively in 2012, for example. Measured against enrolment in higher 
education, the enrolment rate in Vocational and Technical institutions is much less, 
reflecting the low entry levels and demand for such type of education (Figure 31) 
Figure 31: Growth in Total Enrolment, Higher and Technical/Vocational Education 2005-2012 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning 
The variation between the years 2006 – 2008 to the growth rate of enrolment is due 
to the fact that as of 2007, GOTEVT was restructured and named Technical and 
Vocational Training Corporation (TVTC), and higher technical institutes for girls upgraded 
and affiliated to the new TVTC (MEP, 2013). The addition of girls’ technical colleges 
could partly explain the increase in enrolment rate, since examining growth rate of total 
graduates from both higher education and TVTC reveals that technical and vocational 
education is actually decreasing (Figure 32) 
Figure 32: Growth in Total Graduates, Higher and Technical/Vocational Education 2005-2012 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning  
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Table 21: Human Resource Development in Saudi - Education (2013) 
Item Unit 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 General Education (Male & Female)          
     Total Enrolment (1000) 4,642.2 4,746.6 4,812.5 4,948.5 5,040.4 5,146.2 5,187.5  
          Primary Level  2,415.6 2,433.1 2,442.5 2,469.9 2,493.1 2,513.8 2,530.7  
          Intermediate Level  1,070.8 1,100.3 1,144.5 1,188.9 1,188.3 1,198.4 1,212.0  
          Secondary Level  953.2 1,000.8 1,013.1 1,058.5 1,143.6 1,206.4 1,226.2  
          Others*  203.6 212.4 212.4 231.2 215.4 227.6 218.6  
     Growth in Total Enrolment % p.a 2.0 2.2 1.4 2.8 1.9 2.1 0.8  
          
Graduates (Male & Female)          
           Secondary Level (1000) 252.7 267.9 308.8 321.0 347.1 350.7 390.8  
            Growth in Secondary Level % p.a 5.6 6.0 15.3 4.0 8.1 1.0 11.4  
          
Pupil/Teacher Ratio Primary Level  11.3 11.3 11.2 10.8 11.2 11.0 10.9  
Pupil/Teacher Ratio Secondary Level  11.9 11.8 11.5 11.7 11.0 10.8 10.7  
          
Higher Education (Male & Female)          
     Total Enrolment  (1000) 603.8 636.2 674.4 714.9 757.8 903.6 1,021.3 1,206.0 
     Total Graduates   94.8 103.8 112.1 123.1 115.8 120.8 137.1  
              Growth in Enrolment % p.a 5.6 5.4 6.0 6.0 6.0 19.2 13.0 18.1 
              Growth in Graduates  14.3 9.4 8.0 9.7 -5.9 4.3 13.5  
          
Institute of Public Administration          
     Total Enrolment Number 43,132 14,104 49,501 53,941 51,904 50,503 65,495 70,328 
     Total Graduates  42,329 40,292 48,404 52,889 51,001 49,440 64,382 69,278 
          
Technical & Vocational Training          
    Total Enrolment  61,640 53,490 91,7301/ 87,174 93,986 102,939 115,948 115,940 
  Enrolment in Vocational Training   21,054 13,130 24,713 20,182 19,3603/ 16,262 21,682 19,560 
  Enrolment in Technical Training  40,586 40,360 67,017 66,9922/ 74,626 86,677 94,266 96,380 
  Growth in Total Enrolment % p.a -1.2 -13.2  24.4 7.8 9.5 12.6 -0.0 
          
    Total Graduates Number 16723 17416 304451/ 24996 22563 29099 28226 26690 
  Graduates of Vocational Training   6667 6498 16730 12570 9721 8387 6317 6160 
  Graduates of Technical Training  10056 10918 13715 12426 12842 20712 21909 20530 
  Growth in Total Graduates % p.a -2.8 4.1  8.0 -9.7 29.0 -3.0 -5.4 
Note: * Includes pre-school, teacher training, adult and special education 
1/ As of 2007, technical education and vocational training have been integrated into the Technical & Vocational Training 
Corporation (TVTC); higher technical institutes for girls have also been upgraded and affiliated to technical colleges; the 
General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training (GOTEVT) has been renamed "Technical and 
Vocational Training Corporation (TVTC)". 2/ Includes trainees at Higher Technical Training Institute for girls. 3/ Includes 
1753 trainees in vocational institute at prisons.  
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning 2013. 
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Aside from the variations between higher education, on one hand, and technical and 
vocational training, on the other hand; the structural inefficiency in the labor market is 
visible when measured by percentage of employment in the private sector against 
educational level (Table 22). The majority of Saudi-nationals employed in the private 
sector are intermediate, secondary ,or Bachelor’s degree holders, representing 67 percent 
out of the total Saudi private sector population (Figure 33), while the majority of non-
nationals are either illiterate or only read and write, representing 77 percent out of the total 
foreign population in private sector (Figure 34). 
Figure 33: Distribution of Saudis in the Private Sector by Educational Level 2010 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2010 
Figure 34: Distribution of Foreigners in the Private Sector by Educational Level 2010 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2010
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Measured against each other; the variation in educational level points to the 
structural inefficiency in labor market. As shown in (Figure 35) the percentage of Saudi-
nationals in the private sector against non-nationals reveals a parity diagram, while 
measured against total amount, it reveals that KSA private sector labor force is soaked with 
low-skilled, low-wage uneducated employees (Figure 36). In sum, more than 50 percent of 
the total private sector labor force can only read and write, while the percentage of Saudis 
at this educational level is only 2.62 percent. The highest percentage of education level 
among Saudis; secondary degree holders, at 44 percent, represents only 9.26 percent of the 
total private sector labor force. 
Figure 35: National vs. Non-National Employment in the Private Sector against Educational Level 2010 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2010 
Figure 36: Number of National vs. Non-National in the Private Sector against by Educational Level 2010 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2010 
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 As mentioned above, the average private sector salary is driven down by the low 
margin of non-national salary. When salaries in the private sector are measured against 
educational level (Table 23) the variation is very clear (Figure 37). The linear line of both 
national and non-national wages according to educational level suggests that nationals 
have higher wage expectations as they receive more education. This in part explains why 
most unemployed Saudis are highly educated rather than low educated (Figure 38). 
Figure 37: National vs. Non-National Salaries in Private Sector according to Educational Level 2009 
 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2009 
Figure 38: National vs. Non-National Salaries in Private Sector according to Educational Level 2009 
 
 Source: Ministry of Labor, Annual Labor Statistics 2009 
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VII. Conclusion 
The Saudization program in its current form suffers negative externalities that should 
be addressed. This paper concludes that; the main issue with unemployment in KSA, 
especially among youth, is not related to efforts of MOL or its national programs such as 
Saudization through Nitaqat; as much as it has to do with the current structure of the 
economy being labor-intensive in nature, rather than capital-intensive. The Nitaqat 
Program yielded some developments in term of employing more Saudis in the private 
sector, however, the rate by which employment is increasing is similar to the rate by which 
the national labor force is growing; thus, self-defeating the efforts of MOL and keeping the 
rate of unemployment stagnant through the years. It could be argued that without the 
intervention of the government through MOL programs; the employment situation could 
have been worse; however, it should be noted too that analysis reveals that the key to 
solving this issue lies in reforming MOL efforts through number of policy lines, as well as, 
in addressing the inefficiencies in the labor market that resulted from structural 
deficiencies of the economy itself. 
Currently, MOL sets high Saudization targets for economic activities that already 
enjoy high rates of Saudization, while setting low targets for other economic activities with 
low Saudi-nationals participation rate. This is due to the structure of the economy itself as 
it is visible that issues such as wage differentials play a huge role in setting the labor 
market structure; a point which quota policy could only remedy to a certain point. MOL, 
realizes that setting high Saudization targets for the construction sector, for example, will 
hamper growth in that sector, yet it is such sector that relies heavily on foreign labor and 
could in return play a huge role in increasing levels of employment among young Saudis. 
So far, as Mellahi(2007) puts it: conformity with laws is not a straightforward 
relationship, and that organizations in general are not passive implementers of laws and 
regulations as obedience is usually dependent on a set of many varieties, which include the 
public support to such regulations, legal loopholes, and ability to influence law enforcers. 
Thus, the huge research body done on government interference in HRM [Human Resource 
Management], such as affirmative action in the U.S and South Africa, gender-based quotas 
 in Sweden, and Malaysia’s New Economic Reform Policy program; all indicates, “Legal 
interventions in HRM are often costly, highly ambiguous and riddled with loopholes”
addition: “Quotas and occupational bans are policies of micro
monitoring capability that is beyond even the most modern of bureaucracies. They cre
incentives for manipulation, fake employment
moreover are insensitive to the cost caused to individual companies, which can imply a 
very uneven burden on the private sector and can stymie the development of part
industries”.(Hertog, 2012). The analysis reveals that market
policies are weak in KSA, in comparison, to policies based on legal enforcement through 
the quota-based regime.  
What the analysis reveals
underemployment, that the “Labor market segmentation is the main explanation for the 
low labor market participation rate in Saudi Arabia. Low participa
unemployment per se, indicates the scale of the employment challenge. Unemployment put 
in 2007 at 11.05% is a lesser challenge than underemployment” (
Figure 39: Employment Rates KSA vs. Other Countries 2007 (Percent)
 Source: OECD, CDSI, SAMA and MOL in 
 In general, the policy of Saudization relies on 
interventionist methods under t
- Employment quotas of Saudi
and type of economic activity.  
- Levying fees on foreign workers, which rais
the market between nationals and n
- Increasing the flexibility of foreign labor mobility by 
system 
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- Investing in the development of Saudi-nationals skills through training and 
education 
- Providing wage-subsidies for hiring Saudi-nationals in private sector companies. 
The analysis reveals that the wage structure in the private sector lies on the heart of 
the unemployment problem. The average private sector wage has declined over time 
(Table 24), in contrast with the public sector wages. Wages are actually one of the reasons 
for low levels of Saudi –nationals’ interest in private sector jobs 
Table 24: Average Private Sector Wages for Nationals and Non-Nationals 2004 -2007 in SAR 
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Saudi 4367 3878 3596 3624 
Non-Saudi 1037 1028 1060 1011 
Average 1385 1360 1384 1354 
Source: Ministry of Labor 
Finally, the analysis shows that availability of cheap labor as (Hertog, 2012) 
mentions: “might in fact have stymied efforts at increasing productivity. To some extent, 
therefore, higher wage levels will by themselves induce a quest for higher productivity... 
Generally speaking, market-based nationalization will lead to fewer nationals replacing 
more expatriates. The assumption of a one-to-one substitution on which some of the past 
labor market plans have been based are unrealistic, as they include numerous low wage 
jobs that will (and should) disappear in the course of nationalization. Expected national-
expatriate substitution ratios for Gulf countries have been estimated at 30 percent. This 
means that wages up to three times as high can be paid presuming that the labor of higher 
will be utilized more productively”. 
In essence, KSA government should address the private sector’s labor market 
inefficiencies of education, wage differential, public sector competition and labor 
productivity if it aims to trigger more levels of Saudization and employment beyond the 
stagnant levels witnessed so far. 
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VIII. Policy Recommendations 
There are number of policies worth consideration by KSA government in order to 
improve the Saudization policy, as well as to address the challenge of unemployment 
among youth. Such policies might not target the challenge of unemployment in its entirety; 
however, it tackles the major current inefficiencies in the labor market. 
1. Data Proliferation: 
Saudization is a complex and new policy, so far, the amount of data and types of 
datasets provided by the government are limited and linear in most cases. There is a lack of 
proper datasets, which hinders efforts to investigate the effects of this policy at the needed 
level. For example, MOL counts any Saudi-national hired by the private sector for less 
than the minimum public wage of SAR 3,000 per month as a half-point in Saudization 
quotas. On the other hand, disabled and other nationals with certain conditions are counted 
for more than one-point in Saudization. Thus, fulfilling the quota is not a direct numerical 
process and it does not reflect a linear rate of Saudization. In addition, MOL publishes its 
data on yearly basis and there are no quarterly updated statistics on unemployment. In this 
respect, KSA could look into increasing its unemployment data proliferation to allow more 
in-depth analysis that could yield a better understanding on the dynamics of the labor 
market. 
2. Role of SMEs: 
The role of SMEs is underutilized in KSA despite it representing 90 percent of 
private sector enterprises. On the first hand, SMEs are used by many firms in the private 
sector for shirking practices to bypass quota requirements since micro companies are 
exempted from Saudization quotas currently. On the second hand, SMEs lack much-
needed financial assistance to reach its potential. In this respect, KSA could look into a set 
of laws that favors SMEs by establishing a quota in government contracts that requires big 
companies to subcontract a percentage of their tenders to SMEs, in addition, establishing 
financial institutions that cater to SMEs need of capital and banking services. SMEs in 
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return could play a huge role in increasing the level of employment among Saudis 
provided that such benefits are tied to the quota system. 
3. Rectifying Educational Imbalance: 
The educational imbalance in KSA results from a huge popular demand on higher 
education, against a huge demand for technical and vocational education by private sector 
companies. One way KSA could rectify this is by ending the free-education regime in 
higher education institutions, thus, forcing more young students to opt for technical and 
vocational education. As Al-Sheikh and Erbas(2012) puts it: “the endowment effect may 
serve as an incentive for delaying labor force participation, for example, by extending the 
duration of university education because education is provided free of charge”. This could 
be done by reducing the endowment provided to students to study in universities, or by 
increasing the endowment to those opting for vocational and technical institutions, creating 
a bigger incentive for such institutions. In addition, the government should rectify the 
imbalance of a higher demand for humanities and social science studies vis-à-vis natural 
sciences by limiting the seats available for such schools within universities.  
4. Citizenship Income: 
This idea was proposed by Hertog(2014a), it suggests providing cash grants for all 
citizens not employed in the public sector.Suggesting thatthis incentive will drive more 
demand by nationals for private sector jobs, as such income will make private sector jobs 
worthy and will reduce the wage differential between public and private sector jobs for 
nationals, and drive the reservation wage down.Such arrangement is similar to the current 
arrangement in the state of Alaska where U.S citizens who reside in the state for at least a 
year are entitled to receive a dividend check from interests earned on oil rents (Hartzok, 
2004).The Citizenship income for private sector employees tackles another important 
point; as put byAl-Sheikh & Erbas(2012): “The rising disparity between increasing public 
and declining private sector wages of Saudis indicates that oil income is not distributed 
equitably between workers of the same generations because public sector workers—
making up more than 50 percent of total Saudi employment—receive a substantially higher 
share in the form of salaries and benefits than private sector workers”. 
76 
 
5. Building Base for Capital-intensive Economy:  
KSA government could address the issue of labor-productivity through incentivizing 
private sector investment in technologies that raise level of productivity per employee and 
expand the knowledge-based economy. The government could facilitate this through 
linking public expenditure with laws that require proliferation of such technologies, thus, 
pushing the private sector towards such needed investment. The Saudi government can use 
its huge public expenditure as a tool to drive the economy towards more capital-intensive 
activities, thus, paving way for reducing cheap unskilled foreign labor and substituting 
them with more educated national labor-force. 
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